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EFFECT OF REDUCTION OF THE AGE OF MAJORITY
ON THE PERMISSIBLE PERIOD OF THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
ALICE

A.

SOLED*

The modern form of the common law rule against perpetuities' has been stated in different ways, ' its traditional formulation
being that "[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest."' 3 Regardless of how the Rule is stated, however,
it uniformly has been agreed 4 that the permissible period of the
Rule is twenty-one years after a life or lives in being at the creation of the interest in question. Until recently, the 21 year period
of the Rule generally has corresponded to the period of time required to elapse between a person's birth and his attainment of
the age of majority. 5 Since 1968, however, at least thirty-six states
*

Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1953, J.D., 1955,

University of Michigan.
1. Hereinafter sometimes referred to in the text of this article as "the Rule."
2. See, e.g., J. GAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUnrms § 201 (4th ed. 1942); 7 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196, 215-216 (2d ed. 1937, reprinted 1966); E.
MILLER, JR., THE CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS IN MARYLAND § 314 (1927); 3 L. SIMEs & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUrURE INTERESTS § 1222 (2d ed. 1956); 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 391 (3d ed. 1939).
3. J. GRAY, supra note 2, § 201.
4. See, e.g., 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 24.12, 24.14 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); 2
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 174 (1st ed. 1766); E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON
271.b.n.1.V. (F. Hargrave and C. Butler ed. 1787); 2 C. FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
AND EXECUTORY DEVISES *77 (318), *82-*83 (321) (5th ed. 1796); J. GRAY, supra note 2,
§§ 201, 206, 223, 224; 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 196, 215-216, 225-227; 4J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *17-*18, *266-*267, *271 (3d ed. 1836); W. LEWIS, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERPETurrY *154-*155, *159-*162, *167-*168 (Am. ed.
1846); E. MILLER, JR., supra note 2, §§ 314, 323; 3 L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 2,
§§ 1222-1225; 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, §§ 391, 399; Jones, Reforming the Law-The
Rule Against Perpetuities,22 MD. L. REV. 269, 271-274 (1962).
5. Note, however, that the age of majority has been 19 in Alaska since 1959 (ALASKA
STAT. § 25.20.010 (1973)) and has been 18 in Wisconsin for limited purposes since 1955
(WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 42.02(3) (1957)). And, the age of majority for females has been 18 in
Arkansas since 1873 (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-103 (1947)), in Idaho since 1864 (IDAHO CODE
§ 32-101 (1963)), in Illinois since 1872 (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 131 (Smith-Hurd 1961)),
in Montana since 1895 (MONT. CONST. art. II, § 14 and MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 64-101
(1947)), in South Dakota since 1877 (S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-1-1 (1967)), and in
Utah since 1898 (UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1972)); although the age of majority for males
still is 21 in Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-103 (1947)) and in Utah (UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 15-2-1 (1972)), and was reduced to 18 only as recently as 1971 in Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 3, § 131 (Smith-Hurd 1961), as amended in 1971 (Supp. 1974)) and 1972 in Idaho
(IDAHO CODE § 32-101 (1963), as amended in 1972 (Supp. 1973)), in Montana (MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 14 and MONT. REy. CODE ANN. § 64-101 (1947), as amended in 1972
(Supp. 1973)), and in South Dakota (S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-1-1 (1967), as
amended in 1972 (Supp. 1973)).
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have reduced the age of majority below 21.6 This trend has
prompted the suggestion that a reduction in the age of majority
may require a corresponding reduction in the permissible period
of the Rule,7 since, "[f]rom an historical point of view, it would
seem to be clear that age 21 [the twenty-one year period of the
Rule] was originally selected to correspond with the age of majority."8 According to this hypothesis, for example, a reduction in
the age of majority to 18 may impliedly require a corresponding
6. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-215.14, 1-215.17 (1956), as amended in 1972 (Supp.
1973); CAL. CIv. CODE § 25 (West 1954), as amended in 1972 (West Supp. 1974), and
§ 25.1, added in 1972 (West Supp. 1974); CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (1970) § 1-1d, added in
1972 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. (1963) § 743.07, added in 1973 (Supp. 1974-1975); GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-104 (1933), as amended in 1972 (No. 862 [19721 Ga. L. 193); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-101 (1963), as amended in 1972 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 131 (SmithHurd 1961), as amended in 1971 (Supp. 1974); IND. CODE §§ 34-1-67-1 (6), (15) (1973), as
amended in 1973 (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 599.1 (1949), as amended in 1972 (Supp.
1974-1975); Ky. REv. STAT. § 2.015 (1969), as amended in 1968; LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
37 (West 1952), as amended in 1972 (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 72 (1964),
as amended in 1969 (Ch. 433 [1969] Me. P.L. 1150-1151) and in 1972 (Supp. 1973), and
tit. 1, § 73, added in 1969 (Ch. 433 [19691 Me. P.L. 1151-1152), as amended in 1972
(Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 24, added in 1973 by ch. 651, § 1 [1973] Md. Laws
1300 (originally intended to be codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 21 (Supp. 1973));
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7 (48)-(51) (1973), added in 1973 eff. 1/1/74 (Supp. 1973);
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.51-.55, added in 1971 (No. 79 [1971] Mich. P.A.); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 645.45 (3) (1964), as amended in 1973 (Supp. 1974); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 14
and MONT.REV. CODE ANN. § 64-101 (1947), as amended in 1972 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 38-101 (1968), as amended in 1969 (L.B. 167 [1969] Neb. Sess. L. 1072) and in
1972 (L.B. 1086 [1972] Neb. Sess. L. 579); NEV. REV. STAT. ch. 129.010 (1971), as
amended in 1973 (ch. 753 [1973] Nev. Stat. 1577, 1578)-for limited purposes only; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21:44, 21-B:1, added in 1972 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17B1 to -3, added in 1972, eff. 1/1/73 (Supp. 1974-1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-2-2K and 1313-1, added in 1971 (Supp. 1973); Chs. 889-940 [1974] N.Y. Laws 1375-1444 (amending
scattered sections of McKinney's New York laws); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48A-1, -2, added
in 1971 (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-01 (1971), as amended in 1973 (Supp.
1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.02 (Page 1968), as amended in 1973, eff. 1/1/74 (Supp.
1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 13, added in 1972 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 1512-1, added in 1972 (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-1-1 (1967), as amended
in 1972 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-305 (30), added in 1972 (Supp. 1973); TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5923b, added in 1973 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 173 (1972),
as amended in 1971 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42 (1973), added in 1972; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.010 (1961), as amended in 1971 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2-2-10 (m) (1971), as amended in 1972 (Supp. 1974), and § 2-2-10 (aa), added in 1972
(Supp. 1974); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 8-18.1, added in 1973 (Supp. 1973). In all but three of
these states, the age of majority was reduced to 18. In Iowa, Nebraska and Wyoming, the
age of majority was reduced to 19.
7. Section of Estates and Trusts, Report, 5 MD.B.J. No. 4 at 32, 33 (July, 1973);
Stiller, Estate planningchanges necessitated by statutoryreduction of the age of majority,
1 ESTATE PLANNING No. 1, at 2, 5-6 (Autumn, 1973). Cf. Knag, The Connecticut EighteenYear-Old EmancipationAct: Problems of Constructionand Application Encountered By
the Estates and Trusts Practitioner,47 CONN. B.J. 147, 165-166 (1973).
8. Section of Estates and Trusts, supra note 7, at 33; Stiller, supra note 7, at 5.
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reduction in the permissible period of the Rule to eighteen years
after a life or lives in being at the creation of the interest in
question.
Consequently, by its terms, this hypothesis poses a problem
only for those jurisdictions in which the permissible period of the
Rule is a creature of the common law, rather than of statute,9 and
the age of majority has been reduced for all purposes, including
those of the common law, rather than for limited purposes or for
purposes of statutory construction only. At least seventeen states
presently are in this category.10 The problem is particularly acute
in those jurisdictions where the statute reducing the age of majority expressly states that it does so for all common law purposes,
as in Maine," New Hampshire,'" North Carolina' 3 and Virginia.' 4
It is almost as acute in Maryland, where the preamble to the
legislation reducing the age of majority states that such legislation is "generally related to a comprehensive lowering of the age
of majority from 21 to 18 years of age in common law and in the
enumerated sections and articles of the Annotated Code of Maryland",'5 although the legislation itself nowhere expressly states
that the age of majority is reduced for common law purposes.'"
The theory that a statutory reduction in the age of majority
may require a corresponding reduction in the permissible period
of the Rule apparently is based upon the historical origin of the
Rule's 21 year element." However, resolution of the problem
9. In this context, the permissible period of the Rule is a creature of statute only if
its duration is expressly set forth in a statute. (See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.2 (West
1954); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-707 (1933); IND. CODE § 32-1-4-1 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 381.215 (1969); OHIo REV. CODE Arc. § 2131.08 (Page 1968)). Conversely, the permissible period of the Rule here is considered to be a creature of the common law, even if the
Rule itself is adopted expressly by statute, if the duration of the permissible period of the
Rule is not set forth in the statute. (See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-261.01, added
in 1963 (Supp. 1973): "The common law rule known as the rule against perpetuities shall
hereafter be applicable.
... ; MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 11-102 (1974), formerly
Md. Ann. Code art. 93 § 11-102 (1969): "[Tjhe common law rule against perpetuities as
now recognized in the state is preserved .... ").
10. Alaska; Connecticut; Florida; Illinois; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Nebraska;
New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina; Rhode Island; South Dakota;
Texas; Vermont; Virginia. For the citations to the statutes in these jurisdictions reducing
the age of majority, see notes 5 (Alaska) and 6 supra.
11. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 73, added in 1969 (Ch. 433 [1969] Me. P.L. 11511152), as amended in 1972 (Supp. 1973).
12. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-B:1, added in 1972 (Supp. 1973).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48A-1, -2, added in 1971 (Supp. 1973).
14. VA. CODE ANN. f 1-13.42 (1973), added in 1972.
15. Ch. 651 [1973] Md. Laws 1300, 1303.
16. See ch. 651 [1973] Md. Laws 1300.
17. See Section of Estates and Trusts, supra note 7, at 33; Stiller, supra note 7, at
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posed by this theory in fact depends upon the significance of the
21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule, as distinguished from its rationale or historical basis." For, as a general
proposition, a statute will not be construed to alter the common
law unless its language so mandates, either expressly (which is
not the case here) or by necessary implication. 9 And, despite the
wide acceptance of the maxim that where the reason of a common
law rule ceases the rule also ceases,20 elimination of the historical
basis of a rule of property law does not necessarily require elimination of the rule itself. For example, the doctrine that a contingent remainder is destructible by a premature determination of
the preceding particular freehold estate originated as a corollary
of the feudal requirement that transfer of a freehold interest in
land be by feoffment with livery of seisin .2 Yet, in spite of the fact
that, with few exceptions, transfer by livery of seisin either never
existed or was early abolished in this country, 22 the destructibility
rule has persisted in most jurisdictions here unless and until abrogated by statute. 23 Similarly, it has been argued that, since the
possibility of reverter resulted from application of the feudal doctrine of tenure, its existence depends upon the existence of ten18. See Knag, supra note 7, at 165-166. Section of Estates and Trusts, supra note 7,
at 33, and Stiller, supra note 7, at 5, state, with respect to this problem, that "[tihe issue
is whether or not the designation of 21 years in the rule against perpetuities is intended
to be related to a person's status as an adult." However, while the quoted language,
standing alone, could be construed to refer to the significance of the 21 year element of
the permissible period of the Rule, it becomes unclear, when the quoted language is taken
in context, whether such language refers to the significance of the 21 year element or to
its rationale or historical basis. See Section of Estates and Trusts, supra note 7, at 33;
Stiller, supra note 7, at 5-6.
19. 1 J. KENT, supra note 4, at *464; J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 50.05, 61.01 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973, 1974). E.g., Lutz v. State, 167 Md.
12, 172 A. 354 (1934); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 514-15, 165 A. 470, 473-474 (1933);
Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 361, 200 N.W. 76, 82 (1924). See Sprecher v.
Sprecher, 206 Md. 108, 113, 110 A.2d 509, 511-512 (1955). But see Linkins v. Protestant
Episcopal Cathedral Foundation of the District of Columbia 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
20. E.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). The classical expression of the
maxim is "cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 288 (4th ed.
1951).
21. 1 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 2, § 193, at 216 and § 209, at 246.
22. 1 L. SimES & A. SMrrH, supra note 2, § 193, at 216.
23. 1 L. SiMEs & A. SNOTH, supra note 2, §§ 207, 209. For example, notwithstanding
the effective abolition in Maryland of the requirement of livery of seisin as of 1766 (MD.
ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 4-104 (1974), formerly Md. Ann. Code art. 21, § 4-104
(1973); Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443 (Md. 1839), followed in Key's Lessee v. Davis,
1 Md. 32 (1851)), the destructibility rule apparently persisted in Maryland until abrogated
in 1929 by statute now codified as MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 11-101 (1974),
formerly Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 11-101 (1969). (See Crisfield v. Storr, 36 Md. 129, 11
Am. R. 480 (1872) (dictum)).
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urial ownership unmodified by the Statute Quia Emptores.2 1 Yet,
the possibility of reverter generally is recognized in this country
today,2 even though, in most jurisdictions,26 ownership is allodial
or the Statute Quia Emptores is in effect.
Thus, if the 21 year element of the permissible period of the
Rule in fact represents an actual minority, or a period equal to
an actual minority, then, by definition, a reduction in the age of
majority would cause a corresponding reduction in the permissible period of the Rule. 2 7 Conversely, if the 21 year element of the
permissible period of the Rule is a period in gross unconnected
with an (actual) minority, i.e., is not, and need not be, related to
any person's status as a minor or adult, a reduction in the age of
majority necessarily should have no effect on the permissible period of the Rule irrespective of its historical origin.28
In this connection, it must be noted that, since the problem
is one of first impression, so to speak, the determination to be
made is what the 21 year element of the permissible period of the
Rule actually and/or potentially represented at the time as of
which the English common law was received here." And, this is
so regardless of what it may in fact have represented at some prior
24. J. GRAY, supra note 2, §§ 31, 39; 1 L. SwEs & A. SmTH, supra note 2, §§ 17,
283, stating the argument, but concluding that it is immaterial in view of the present
general recognition of the existence of the possibility of reverter. But see J. GRAY, supra
note 2, § 39 n.1, at 37-38; 1 L. SirAEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 2, §§ 17, 283.
25. E.g., J. GRv, supra note 2, § 39; 1 L. Siss & A. SmrrH, supra note 2, § 283.
26. J. GRAY, supra note 2, §§ 23-28, 38, 39. In Maryland, for example, the possibility
of reverter flourishes like the green bay tree (see, e.g., Ringgold v. Carvel, 196 Md. 262,
76 A.2d 327 (1950); McMahon v. Consistory of St. Paul's Church, 196 Md. 125, 75 A.2d
122 (1950); Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 190 Md. 332, 58 A.2d 649
(1948); Perkins v. Inglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d 672 (1944); Conner v. Waring, 52 Md.
724 (1880); MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art. §§ 6-101 to -105 (1974), formerly Md. Ann.
Code art. 21, §§ 6-101 to -105 (1973)), although land ownership has been allodial since
the American Revolution. (Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 443 (Md. 1839)).
27. See Section of Estates and Trusts, supra note 7, at 33; Stiller, supra note 7, at
5-6.
28. Knag, supra note 7, at 165-166.
29. See McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A.2d 229, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 862
(1964); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Gilbert v. Findlay
College, 195 Md. 508, 74 A.2d 36 (1950); Lickle v. Boone, 187 Md. 579, 51 A.2d 162 (1947);
Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933); State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 9
Am. Dec. 534 (Md. 1821); Coomes v. Clements, 4 H. & J. 480 (Md. 1819); State v. Brown,
21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974); State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 255 A.2d 470
(1969); Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924); Becker v. Chester, 115
Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902) (dictum); W. FRATCHER, PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESMTRAINTS
270, 271 (1954). Cf. Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation of the District
of Columbia, 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Latz v. Latz a/k/a Schafer, 10 Md. App. 720,
272 A.2d 435, pet. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971).
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point in time.30 In fact, if there is a conflict between the actual
and the potential nature of a common law rule as of the time we
received the common law, it would appear that the potential
prevails over the actual. 3 ' For, the common law rule against
perpetuities entered our jurisprudence by virtue of our reception
of the English common law. 3 And, it generally is held that the
common law received by us is "the common law in mass, as it
existed here, either potentially, or practically, and as it prevailed
in England at the time [as of which the common law was received
here]. . .. -31Moreover, in determining what the common law
potentially was at the time of its reception here, subsequent decisions
must be received as expositions of the law as it before existed, and not as creating a new law, or altering the old one,
which could only be done by legislative enactment ...
And it is a mistake to suppose, that they are expansions of
the common law, which is a system of principles not capable
of expansion, but always existing. ....3
30. See Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391 (1896); State v. Buchanan, 5 H. &
J. 317, 358, 9 Am. Dec. 534, 568 (Md. 1821). Cf. Linkins v. Protestant Episocpal Cathedral
Foundation of the District of Columbia, 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
31. See Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation of the District of
Columbia, 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Cf. Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391 (1896).
32. J. GRAY,supra note 2, § 200. E.g., Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391 (1896);
Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348,
92 A. 312 (1914); Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902) (dictum). See 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 1.40; 1 J. KENT, supra note 4, at *470-*473.
The English common law was received in this country as of various times, depending upon
the jurisdiction. Among the most common reception dates appear to be 1607 (usually
described as the fourth year of James I) [e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-1-1 (1963);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 28, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1961)] and July 4, 1776 [e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 2.01 (1963); MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5 (1972)]. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 1.40, and 1 J. KENT, supra note 4, at *470-*473, contain a
general discussion of the dates as of which the common law was received here.
33. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 358, 9Am. Dec. 534, 568 (Md. 1821). Accord,
McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A.2d 229, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 862 (1964); Gilbert v.
Findlay College, 195 Md. 508, 74 A.2d 36 (1950); Lickle v. Boone, 187 Md. 579, 51 A.2d
162 (1947); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933); State v. Brown, 21 Md. App.
91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974); Latz v. Latz a/k/a/ Schafer, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971),
pet. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971); State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 255 A.2d 470 (1969).
See Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902); W. FRATCHER, supra note 29, at
270, 271.
34. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 357, 9 Am. Dec. 534, 566, 567 (Md. 1821).
Accord, Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391 (1896); McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273,
199 A.2d 229, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 862 (1964). See Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343,
200 N.W. 76 (1924); Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902); W. FRATCHER, supra
note 29, at 270, 271. Cf. Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation of the
District of Columbia, 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Latz v. Latz a/k/a Schafer, 10 Md.
App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971), pet. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971).
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In Colorado, for example, where the common law reception date
is 1607,11 it has been held"6 that the modern common law rule
against perpetuities is part of that state's received common law,
even though the development of the modem form of the Rule
commenced only in 1685, with the final decision in The Duke of
Norfolk's Case." In so holding, the Colorado Supreme Court
stated:
The common law thus being a constant growth, gradually
expanding and adapting itself to the changing conditions of
life and business from time to time, what the law is at any
particular time must be determined from the latest decisions
of the courts; and the recognized theory is that, aside from
the influence of statutory enactments, the latest judicial
announcement of the courts is merely declaratory of what
the law is and always has been. 8
Similarly, in Maryland, where the common law reception date is
July 4, 1776,'3 the Maryland Court of Appeals 40 has used post1776 cases as authority for the proposition that, as of July 4, 1776,
it was established law that burglary can be committed in a
4
church at common law. 1
Upon application of the above principles, it becomes clear
that a reduction in the age of majority should have no effect on
the permissible period of the Rule. For, as will be shown hereafter, it is almost indisputable that, as of the time of our reception
of the English common law, the 21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule was potentially a period in gross unconnected with an actual minority.
35. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-1-1 (1963).
36. Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391 (1896).
37. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 963 (H. L. 1685), aff'g 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng.
Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
38. 23 Colo. 40, 56, 45 P. 391, 397 (1896).
39. MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5 (1972).
40. McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A.2d 229, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 862 (1964).
41. It should be noted that, while there are Maryland decisions stating that post1776 English decisions are not authoritative in Maryland with respect to the state of the
common law in 1776 (e.g., Gilbert v. Findlay College, 195 Md. 508, 74 A.2d 36 (1950);
Dudrow v. King, 117 Md. 182, 83 A. 34 (1912); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369
(1868); Koontz v. Nabb, 16 Md. 549 (1861), these decisions appear to confuse the reception
of English decisions construing received English statutes, which is frozen as of July 4, 1776
[MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF R'mTs, art. 5 (1972), as construed in The Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Willianis, 6 Md. 235 (1854), Dashiell v. The Attorney General, 5
H. & J. 392, 9 Am. Dec. 572 (Md. 1822), and State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 255 A.2d
470 (1969)], with the reception of the English common law, which is not so frozen [MD.
CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5 (1972), as construed in Dashiell v. The Attorney
General, supra, and State v. Magliano, supra]. E.g., Koontz v. Nabb, supra.
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RULE

IN ENGLAND

agreed4 2

It is generally
that the evolution in England of the
modem form of the common law rule against perpetuities commenced in 1685 with the decision of the House of Lords in The
Duke of Norfolk's Case," which held that an interest is not void
for remoteness if it must vest, if at all, within a life in being at
its creation. It likewise is agreed" that such evolution ended in
1833, with the decision of the House of Lords in Cadell v.
45 which held that the maximum permissible period of the
Palmer,
Rule is "a life or lives in being [at the creation of the interest in
question], and 21 years afterwards [as a term in gross], without
reference to the infancy of any person whatever."46 Thus, while
Cadell v. Palmer47 conclusively settled that the 21 year element
of the permissible period of the Rule is a period in gross which is
not, and need not be, related to any person's status as a minor or
adult,48 it did so some years after the time as of which we received
the English common law, which generally is prior to 1800.11 Nonetheless, consideration of the evolution in England of the modem
form of the Rule clearly indicates that, at the time as of which
the common law was received here, whether it be 160 7 ,50 177651 or
42. See J. GRAY,supra note 2, §§ 168-170; 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 196,
223-226; 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 2, §§ 1211, 1213; 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2,
§ 399; Jones, supra note 4, at 269, 271; 18 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS, (N.Y.) LAW
REVISION COMMISSION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65, 159TH SESs. 36, 40

(1936).
43. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 963 (H.L. 1685), aff'g 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng.
Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
44. See J. GRAY, supra note 2, §§ 185, 186; 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 226227; W. LEWIS, supra note 4, at *154-*162; E. MILLER, JR., supra note 2, § 314, at 889; 3
L. SiMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 2, §§ 1215, 1216; 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 399; Jones,
supra note 4, at 269; 18 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS, (N.Y.) LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65, 159TH SESS. 39 (1936). For a general discussion of the history of the Rule, see also 2 C. FEAINE, supra note 4, at *1(298) et seq.; 4 J.
KENT, supra note 4, at *263-*267.
45. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H. L. 1833).
46. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 421, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 974 (H. L. 1833).
47. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H. L. 1833).
48. J. GRAY, supra note 2, § 186; 29 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 579, at 289
(3d ed. 1960); 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 227-228; W. LEWIS, supra note 4, at *160;
3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 2, § 1215; 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2, § 399; Jones,
supra note 4, at 269, 272; 18 N.Y. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS, (N.Y.) LAW REVISION COMMISSION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, LEGIS. DOC. No. 65, 159TH SEsS. 39 (1936).
49. See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 1.40; 1 J. KENT, supra
note 4, at *470-*473.
50. E.g., COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-1-1 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 28, § 1 (SmithHurd 1961). This date usually is referred to as the fourth year of James I, rather than as
1607. Id.
51. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (1963); MD.CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 5
(1972).
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some other date prior to 1833, the 21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule was potentially, if not actually, a period in
gross unrelated to any actual minority.
2 involved a conveyance which
The Duke of Norfolk's Case"
may be summarized as follows: To T in trust for A and the heirs
male of his body, but if X should die without male issue during
the life of A, or if A should inherit the settlor's earldom, then in
trust for C and the heirs male of his body (which limitation was
followed by the limitation of successive remainders in tail). Upon
X's death without issue during the life of A, the question of the
validity of the executory limitation over in favor of C was raised
in Chancery. In 1682, Lord Chancellor Nottingham held 3 the
executory limitation in favor of C to be valid since it did not tend
to a perpetuity. Although the Lord Chancellor's decree was reversed by Lord Keeper North in 1683,-' it thereafter was affirmed,
without opinion, by the House of Lords in 1685.11 On its facts, The
Duke of Norfolk's Case" must be considered to hold only that an
interest (C's) which must vest, if at all, within a life in being at
its creation (i.e., A's life) is not void as tending to a perpetuity
(i.e., is not void for remoteness).
In connection with our problem, however, it is noteworthy
that the Lord Chancellor, in so holding, relied primarily upon the
cases of Pells v. Brown, " decided in 1620, and Hinde v. Lyon, 5
decided in 1578. The latter, it will be noted, was decided prior to
the earliest time as of which we received the common law. Each
of these cases involved a limitation which can be reformulated as
follows: "To A and his heirs, and if A die without issue during the
life of B, then to B and his heirs." Both cases held the limitation
over to B to be a valid executory limitation. And, although the
question of remoteness of vesting (of tendency to a perpetuity)
was not raised in either case, the Lord Chancellor considered
them to be determinative that the limitation before him did not
tend to a perpetuity."9
Even more important, however, than the Lord Chancellor's
52. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), afl'd, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep.
931, 963 (H. L. 1685).
53. Id.
54. See 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 963 (H. L. 1685).
55. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 963 (H. L. 1685).
56. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), aff'd, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep.
931, 963 (H. L. 1685).
57. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K. B. 1620).
58. 3 Leonard 64, 74 Eng. Rep. 543 (Com. P1. 1578).
59. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 31-32, 36, and 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 949-950, 953, and 960-961 (Ch.
1681, 1682).
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reliance on Pells v. Brown1° and Hinde v. Lyon,' is his holding
that an interest which must vest, if at all, within a life in being
at its creation does not tend to a perpetuity because no inconvenience is caused by the contingency.2 And, most important is his
elaborative dictum to the effect that his decision does not in fact
determine the maximum duration of the period within which the
contingency upon which an estate is limited must occur in order
for there to be no inconvenience (and thus no tendency to a perpetuity)8 3 In the oft-quoted words of the Lord Chancellor,
[T]he Law. . . will allow a future Estate arising upon
a Contingency only, and that to wear out in a short Time.
But what Time? And where are the Bounds of that Contingency? You may limit, it seems, upon a Contingency to
happen in a Life: What if it be limited, if such a one die
without Issue within twenty-one Years, or 100 Years, or while
Westminster-Hall stands? Where will you stop, if you do not
stop here? I tell you where I will stop: I will stop where-ever
any visible Inconvenience doth appear; for the just Bounds
of a Fee-simple upon a Fee-simple are not yet determined,
but the first Inconvenience that ariseth upon it will regulate
it.64

In consequence of the above-quoted language, and of the
holding and the dictum which it embodies, The Duke of Norfolk's
Case 5 can be said" to be the foundation of the proposition, there60. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K. B. 1620).
61. 3 Leonard 64, 74 Eng. Rep. 543 (Com. Pl. 1578).
62. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 49 and 51-52, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960 and 961-962 (Ch. 1682).
63. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960 (Ch. 1682). See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 2, at 225-226.
64. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 960 (Ch. 1682). The quoted language, moreover, is repetitive of the Lord Chancellor's prior statement in response to the self-raised
objection "They will perhaps say, where will you stop, if not at Child and Bayly's Case?"
[3 Ch. Cas. 1, 36, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 953 (Ch. 1681)]:
[W]here there is not any Inconvenience, any Danger of a Perpetuity. . .. No Man
ever yet said, a Devise to a Man and his Heirs, and if he die without Issue, living
B. then to B. is a naughty Remainder, that is Pell's and Brown's Case.
Now the Ultimum quod sit, or the utmost Limitation of a Fee upon a Fee, is
not yet plainly determined; but it will be soon found out, if Men shall set their Wits
on Work to contrive by Contingencies to do that, which the Law has so long laboured against; the Thing will make itself evident, where it is inconvenient, and,
God forbid, but that Mischief should be obviated and prevented.
[3 Ch. Cas. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953 (Ch. 1681).]
65. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), aff'd, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep.
931, 963 (H. L. 1685).
66. Compare Lloyd v. Carew, Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H. L. 1697) with
Marks v. Marks, 10 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789 (Ch. 1718).
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after established, 7 that no interest is void for remoteness (i.e., as
tending to a perpetuity) if it must vest, if at all, within a reasonable time after lives in being at its creation. This proposition first
was established by two cases which held that an interest is not
void for remoteness if it must vest, if at all, within a reasonable
period in gross after lives in being at its creation. The first of these
was Lloyd v. Carew,"5 decided by the House of Lords in 1697. The
second was Marks v. Marks, 9 decided in Chancery in 1718.
Lloyd v. Carew7 ° involved a conveyance in trust for the benefit of H for life, then for the benefit of W for life, remainder to
the children of H and W successively in fee tail, then remainder
to H in fee simple, provided, however, that if no issue of H and
W was living at the death of the survivor of them, and if the heirs
of W
should within twelve Months after the Decease of the Survivor of the said [H] and [W] dying without Issue as aforesaid, pay to the Heirs. . .of the said [H] the Sum of 40001.
that then the Remainder in Fee-simple so limited to the said
[H] . . . should cease; and that then, and from thenceforth,
the Premisses should remain to the Use of the right Heirs of
the said [V] for ever.7
W died without issue during H's life. H then died without issue,
leaving a will by which he devised the trust property to J. W's
heirs then brought a bill in Chancery to compel the conveyance
to them of the trust property upon their payment of the 40001.
The bill was dismissed in Chancery. Upon appeal, however, the
House of Lords reversed the "Decree of Dismission." Since the
House of Lords rendered no opinion in the matter, its decision,
standing alone, might be said to hold only that an interest which
must vest, if at all, within a period in gross of one year after lives
in being at its creation is valid. However, while the House of
67. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H. L. 1833); Thellusson v.
Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H. L. 1805) (dictum), afl'g 4 Ves. Jr. 227,
31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1799) (dictum); Lloyd v. Carew, Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep.
93 (H. L. 1697) (by implication); Gulliver v. Wickett, 1 Wils. K.B. 105, 95 Eng. Rep. 517
(K.B. 1745); Gore v. Gore, 2 Stra. 958, 93 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1734); Goodtitle v. Wood,
Willes 211, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 (Com. Pl. 1740); Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms. 686, 24 Eng.
Rep. 917 (Ch. 1732); Marks v. Marks, 10 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789 (Ch. 1718); 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 173-174; 2 C. FEARNE, supra note 4, at *73 (314), *76-*77
(317)-(318); J. GRAY, supra note 2, §§ 178-180; 7 W. HoLDswoRTm, supra note 2, at 227.
Cf. Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1699) (dictum).
68. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H.L. 1697) (so holding by implication).
69. 10 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789 (Ch. 1718).
70. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H. L. 1697).
71. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93, 94 (H. L. 1697) (emphasis added).
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Lords rendered no opinion, the arguments of counsel on both
sides of the question (on which the House of Lords presumably
based its decision") are given in full. These arguments were directed exclusively to the question of whether the litigated limitation tended to a perpetuity within the meaning of Lord Nottingham's opinion in The Duke of Norfolk's Case,7 3 the prevailing
argument being
That there could not in Reason be any Difference between a
Contingency to happen during Life or Lives, or within one
Year afterwards; that the true Reason of such Opinions,
which allowed them if happening within the Time of the
Parties lives, or upon their Deceases, was because no Inconvenience could be apprehended thereby; and the same Reason will hold to one Year afterwards; and the true Rule is to
fix Limits and Boundaries to such Limitations, when so
made, as that they prove Inconvenient, and not otherwise .... 1
Although the arguments of counsel in Lloyd v.Carew7 were formulated in terms of "Inconvenience", the decision therein has
been held to be the foundation of the rule that an interest is good
if it must vest, if at all, within a reasonableperiod in gross after
lives in being at its creation.7"
Thus, in Marks v. Marks," the Court of Chancery, upon the
authority of Lloyd v. Carew,78 upheld as valid the executory interest limited to D. by conveyance to "B. for life, with remainder to
C. in fee, provided, that if D. pay 5001. to C. his executors or
administrators, within three months after the death of B. that
then D. and his heirs shall have the land .... - And, in support
of this holding, the court said:
And though before the case of Lloyd v. Carew .
it seems
to have obtained for law, that no executory devise of a fee
72. See Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 412, 422, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 971, 975 (H. L.
1833).
73. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.1682), a/'d, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep.
931, 963 (H. L. 1685).
74. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 139, 1 Eng. Rep. 93, 95 (H. L. 1697).
75. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H. L. 1697).
76. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 412, 422, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 971, 975 (H. L. 1833);
Gore v. Gore, 2 Stra. 958, 93 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1734) (dictum); Marks v. Marks, 10
Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789 (Ch. 1718). See Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wins. 686, 24 Eng. Rep.
917 (Ch.1732).
77. 10 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789 (Ch.1718).
78. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H. L. 1697).
79. 10 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789, 789-790 (Ch.1718) (emphasis added).
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upon a fee should be allowed of, unless upon a contingency
to happen during the life of one or more persons in being at
the time of the settlement; and consequently the limitation
to Nathaniel would have been void, because dependent upon
a contingency to happen within three months after the death
of the wife; yet since that case . . .the law is now settled,
that in case of a contingency that cannot in the nature of it
precede the death of a person, a reasonable time may be
allowed subsequent to the decease of that person for performance of the condition; and a fee limited thereupon is
good. In that case, a year was held no unreasonable time; d
fortiori not three months, which is the present case. 0
Similarly, in Gore v. Gore,' decided in 1734 by the Court of
King's Bench, on reference from Chancery, an executory devise
was held valid on the authority of Lloyd v. Carew.12 The limitation in Gore was, in effect, to T in trust for 500 years, then to the
first and every other son of A in fee tail male, remainder to B in
fee tail male (with ultimate remainders over). The question
raised was whether the executory devise"3 to the first son of A was
valid, since A had no son at the time of the devisor's death although one was born to him thereafter. Although the period during which vesting of the executory interest could be postponed
after lives in being at its creation was a period of gestation, not a
period in gross, the court treated it as though it was in fact a
period in gross. Thus, on the first argument of this case, in 1722,
it was held that the limitation did not create "a good executory
devise, because it might subsist forty weeks after the death of
[A], and they were not for going a day farther than a life in
being."84 The Chancellor, however, sent the case back to King's
Bench, and, on rehearing, in 1733, the court was
unanimously of opinion, that it was a good executory devise,
and that a convenient time after the life was to be allowed,
according to the case of Lloyd v. Cary [sic], in Show. Parl.
Cases. . . .And this necessarily being to arise within nine
80. 10 Mod. 419, 422, 88 Eng. Rep. 789, 791 (Ch. 1718).
81. 2 Stra. 958, 93 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1734).
82. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H. L. 1697).
83. The interest limited to the first son of A was an executory interest, not a remainder, since an estate for years is a non-freehold estate, and thus there was no precedent
particular estate of freehold to support it. E.g., Gore v. Gore, 2 Stra. 958, 93 Eng. Rep.
967 (K.B. 1734).
84. 2 Stra. 958, 93 Eng. Rep. 967 (K.B. 1734).
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months after the death of [A], there was no danger of a
perpetuity."
To retrace our steps for the moment, it should be noted that,
8 was the first case to hold that an interest
while Lloyd v. Carew"
is not void for remoteness if it must vest, if at all, within a reasonable period in gross after lives in being at its creation, it was not
the first case to consider the point. Thus, in Davies v. Speed, 7
wherein the Court of King's Bench held, in 1692, that an executory devise limited to vest on someone's death without issue is
void, since the law will not expect this to occur, it was stated, as
dictum, that
a feoffment to the use of A. and his heirs, to commence four
years from thence, was good as a springing use, and that the
whole estate remained to the feoffor in the meantime; so it
is if it were to commence after the death of A. without issue,
if he die without issue within twenty years."
Settlement of this rule, that vesting of an interest can validly be
postponed for a reasonable period in gross after lives in being at
its creation, was followed by establishment of the principle that
an interest is valid if it must vest, if at all, within the period of a
minority after lives in being at its creation. 8 This was on the
theory that the period during which vesting might be postponed
was reasonable, since "the power of alienation will not be restrained longer than the law would restrain it, viz. during the
infancy of the first taker, which cannot reasonably be said to
extend to a perpetuity .
. ",
85. Id.
86. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H. L. 1697).
87. 2 Salk. 675, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (K.B. 1692), afJ'd, Show. Parl. Cas. 104, 1 Eng.
Rep. 72 (H.L. 1698).
88. 2 Salk. 675, 675-676, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (K.B. 1692).
89. Cases cited notes 100-121, 145 and 154 infra and accompanying text.
90. Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. Temp. Talb. 228, 232, 25 Eng. Rep. 751, 752 (Ch.
1736). Accord, Cole v. Sewell, 2 H. L. Cas. 186, 9 Eng. Rep. 1062 (H. L. 1848) (dictum);
Cadell v. Palmer, 1 CI. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H. L. 1833) (dictum); Thellusson v.
Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H. L. 1805) (dictum); Long v. Blackall, 7
Term. Rep. 100, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 (K.B. 1797); Doe v. Fonnereau, 2 Dougl. 487, 99 Eng.
Rep. 311 (K.B. 1780) (dictum); In re Ashforth, L.R. 1 Ch. 535 (Ch. 1905) (dictum);
Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1799) (dictum), aff'd, 11
Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H. L. 1805); Marlborough v. Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 28
Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1759) (dictum); Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms. 686, 24 Eng. Rep. 917
(Ch. 1732); Maddox v. Staines, 2 P. Wms. 421, 24 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1727), aff'd sub
nor. Staines v. Maddox, 3 Bro. P. C. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 1209 (H. L. 1728); E. CoKE,supra
note 4, at 20.a.n.5 and 271.b.n.I.V; 7 W. HoLDswoRT, supra note 2, at 227; W. LEWIS,
supra note 4, at 133.
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Prior to the 1833 decision in Cadell v. Palmer," this expansion of the permissible period of the Rule, from lives in being plus
a reasonable period in gross to lives in being plus a period equal
to a minority, was accomplished by holdings and dicta in cases
construing one of three types of limitations: those in which the
vesting of an interest was postponed for lives in being at its creation plus the actual minority of the person to whom the interest
was limited;" those in which the vesting of an interest was postponed for lives in being at its creation plus the actual minority
of one other than the person to whom the interest was limited;93
and those in which the vesting of an interest was postponed for a
period involving neither an actual minority nor any period in
gross. 4 It should be noted, however, that, although Cadell v.
Palmer95 was the first case to hold that the maximum permissible
period of the Rule is "a life or lives in being [at the creation of
the interest in question], and 21 years afterwards [a period equal
to a minority, as a term in gross], without reference to the infancy of any person whatever[.],"" it was not the first case to
hold that the maximum permissible period of the Rule is a period
91. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H. L. 1833).
92. Blandford v. Thackerell, 2 Ves. Jr. 238, 30 Eng. Rep. 612 (Ch. 1793); Stephens
v. Stephens, Cas. Temp. Talb. 228, 25 Eng. Rep. 751 (Ch. 1736); Taylor v. Biddall, 2 Mod.
289, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078 (Com. P1. 1679). See Snow v. Cutler, 1 Lev. 135, 83 Eng. Rep. 335
(K.B. 1664).
93. Gulliver v. Wickett, 1 Wils. K.B. 105, 95 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1745); Goodtitle
v. Wood, Willes 211, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 (Com. Pl. 1740); Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms.
686, 24 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1732); Maddox v. Staines, 2 P. Wms. 421, 24 Eng. Rep. 796
(Ch. 1727), aff'd sub nom. Staines v. Maddox, 3 Bro. P.C. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 1209 (H. L.
1728); Massingberd v. Ash, 2 Ch. Rep. 275, 21 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 1684). See Beard v.
Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393, 128 Eng. Rep. 741 (Com. Pl. 1812, 1813) (on reference from
Chancery), conflicting opinion given by Court of King's Bench on subsequent reference
from Chancery, 5 B. & Ald. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1822), decision of the Court of
King's Bench confirmed by the Lord Chancellor, Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng. Rep. 1002 (Ch.
1822); Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 652, 127 Eng. Rep. 351 (Com. P1. 1804)
(printed as a note to Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 643, 127 Eng. Rep. 347 (Com. P1. 1804) ).
94. Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H. L. 1805), aff'g 4
Ves. Jr. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1799) (vesting postponed for lives in being at the
creation of the interest); Wilkinson v. South, 7 Term. Rep. 555, 101 Eng. Rep. 1129 (K.B.
1798) (vesting postponed for lives in being at the creation of the interest); Long v. Blackall,
7 Term. Rep. 100, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 (K.B. 1797) (vesting postponed for lives in being at
the creation of the interest, including an actual period of gestation); Doe v. Fonnereau, 2
Dougl. 487, 99 Eng. Rep. 311 (K.B. 1780) (vesting postponed for a life in being at the
creation of the interest); Goodman v. Goodright, 2 Burr. 870, 97 Eng. Rep. 608 (K.B. 1759)
(limitation over after an indefinite failure of issue); Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep.
1186 (Ch. 1787) (limitation over after an indefinite failure of issue); Marlborough v.
Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 (Ch. 1759) (limitation in fee tail to unborn issue
of unborn grandson of testator, to whom a life estate was limited).
95. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H. L. 1833).
96. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 421, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 974 (H. L. 1833) (emphasis added).
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in gross of 21 years after lives in being at the creation of the
interest in question. For, those cases upholding the validity of
limitations in which the vesting of an interest was postponed for
lives in being at its creation plus the actual minority of one other
than the person to whom the interest was limited, must be said
to hold that an interest is valid if it must vest, if at all, within a
period in gross of 21 years after lives in being at its creation."
Moreover, despite some noted authority to the contrary," it is
clear that the validity of an interest whose vesting is postponed
for lives in being plus the actual minority of one other than the
person to whom the interest is limited was established priorto the
establishment of the validity of an interest whose vesting is postponed for lives in being plus the actual minority of the same
person to whom the interest is limited."
The validity of an interest whose vesting is postponed for
lives in being at its creation plus the actual minority of one other
than the person to whom the interest is limited first was authoritatively established by the House of Lords' affirmance, in 1728,
of the Court of Chancery's decision in Maddox v. Staines.I® The
limitation construed in this case was in the following form: To A
for life, then to be paid to A's children at their respective ages of
21 (if sons) or 18 (if daughters), income to be paid to A's children
from A's death until the time of distribution, and if no child of A
attained the age of 21 (if a son) or 18 (if a daughter), then the
entire property is to be paid to the children of B. A died without
issue surviving her, and the children of B (the vesting of whose
interest had been postponed for A's life plus the minorities of A's
children) brought a bill in Chancery against A's executors for an
accounting. The Court of Chancery upheld the validity of the
executory devise to the children of B as against the argument that
it might vest too remotely. It did so both on the authority of
Massingberd v. Ash'0 ' and for the reason that
whether [A] shall leave children will be known at her death;
if she does have children, then those children are to have the
proceed and produce of the estate for their maintenance,
until they come to age, before which time if they had the
97. See cases cited notes 120-138 infra and accompanying text.
98. J. GRAY, supra note 2, §§ 171-184; 7 W. HOLDSwOarH, supra note 2, at 226.
99. Compare cases cited notes 100-119 infra and accompanying text, with cases cited
notes 156-162 infra and accompanying text.
100. 2. P. Wins. 421, 24 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1727), afJ'd sub nom. Staines v. Maddox,
3 Bro. P.C. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 1209 (H. L. 1728).
101. 2 Ch. Rep. 275, 21 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 1684), also reported sub nom. Massenburgh v. Ash, 1 Vern. 234, 257, 304, 23 Eng. Rep. 437, 453, 485 (Ch. 1684).
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absolute interest therein, they could not by reason of their
infancy dispose of it; but as soon as they do come to that age,
then they are to have the entire property, and therefore this
is a very good executory devise.' 2
Between the 1728 decision of the House of Lords in Maddox
v. Staines °3 and the 1833 decision of the House of Lords in Cadell
v. Palmer,'4 the validity of executory devises similar to that in
Maddox was upheld in three cases,'05 was asserted by dictum in
a fourth case,'1 apparently was upheld in a fifth case, 0° and apparently was not denied in any case.
More precisely, the cases of Stanley v. Leigh,'° Goodtitle v.
Wood,' 0 and Gulliver v. Wickett"" each upheld the validity of the
executory interest created in B by a limitation in substantially
the following form: To A for life, then to A's oldest child and his
heirs, but if such child should die before attaining the age of 21,
then to B and his heirs. In the Stanley and Gulliver cases, A died
without issue surviving him. In Goodtitle, A was survived by a
son who thereafter died under the age of 21.
In 1732, in upholding the validity of the limitation to B in
the Stanley case, the Court of Chancery stated:
Another objection to the plaintiff's title is, that the limitation to him is postponed. . .to the daughters [of A] arriving to twenty-one or marriage. . .and so the contingency, on
which the limitation to the plaintiff was to take effect, might
not happen within the compass of a life.
•. [however,] a longer time, a year beyond a life, was
allowed in the case of Lloyd and Carew. . . . As to a daughter's arriving at twenty-one or marriage, that is a contingency which must happen within a reasonable time after the
102. 2 P. Wins. 421, 422-423, 24 Eng. Rep. 796, 797 (Ch. 1727).
103. 3 Bro. P.C. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 1209 (H. L. 1728), aff'g 2 P. Wis. 421, 24 Eng.
Rep. 796 (Ch. 1727).
104. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H. L. 1833).
105. Gulliver v. Wickett, 1 Wils. K.B. 105, 95 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1745); Goodtitle
v. Wood, Willes 211, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 (Com. P1. 1740); Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wins.
686, 24 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1732).
106. Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 652, 127 Eng. Rep. 351 (Com. P1. 1804)
(printed as a note to Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 643, 127 Eng. Rep. 347 (Com. Pl. 1804)).
107. Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393, 128 Eng. Rep. 741 (Com. Pl. 1812, 1813) (on
reference from Chancery), conflicting opinion given by Court of King's Bench on subsequent reference from Chancery, 5 B. & Ald. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1822), decision
of the Court of King's Bench confirmed by the Lord Chancellor, Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng.
Rep. 1002 (Ch. 1822).
108. 2 P. Wms. 686, 24 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1732).
109. Willes 211, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 (Com. P1. 1740).
110. 1 Wils. K.B. 105, 95 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1745).
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death of the father [A], and indeed prevent the power of
alienation no longer than the law would do if there were no
such contingency expressed, as it has been held in this Court
(see the case of Maddox versus Staines. . .). This objection
therefore, that the contingency on which the plaintiff's title
is to depend, might not happen strictly within the compass
of a life, is of no weight."'
Similarly, in 1740, in validating the limitation to B in
Goodtitle, Lord Chief Justice Willes said:
[F]irst, it was held that the contingency must happen
within the compass of a life or lives in being, or a reasonable
number of years. . .and the rule has in many instances been
extended to twenty-one years after the death of a person in
being, as in that case likewise there is no danger of a perpetu2
ity."
And, in 1745, in validating the limitation to B in Gulliver,
Chief Justice Lee stated:
That the true construction of this will is, that here is a good
devise to the wife for life, with remainder to the child in
contingency in fee, with a devise over, which we hold a good
executory devise, as it is to commence within 21 years after
a life in being. . .and the number of contingencies are not
material, if they are all to happen within a life in being, or a
reasonable time afterwards."'
In addition to Maddox, Stanley, Goodtitle and Gulliver, one
other case must be considered at this point. This case cannot be
held to authoritativelyestablish that an interest is valid if it must
vest, if at all, within lives in being at its creation plus the actual
minority of one other than the person to whom the interest is
limited, since it was decided in the Court of Chancery. Yet
Massingberdv. Ash"4 so held in 1684, prior to the 1728 affirmance
of Maddox by the House of Lords.
Massingberd involved a limitation which may be formulated
111. Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wins. 686, 691-692, 24 Eng. Rep. 917, 919 (Ch. 1732).
The court previously had defined a perpetuity as "the limiting of an estate..
in such
manner as would render it unalienable longer than for a life or lives in being at the same
time, and some short or reasonable time thereafter." Id. at 688, 24 Eng. Rep. at 917-918
(Ch. 1732).
112. Goodtitle v. Wood, Willes 211, 213, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1137 (Com. Pl. 1740).
113. Gulliver v. Wickett, 1 Wils. K.B. 105, 106-107, 95 Eng. Rep. 517, 518 (K.B.
1745).
114. 2 Ch. Rep. 275, 21 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 1684), also reported sub nom. Massenburgh v. Ash, 1 Vern. 234, 257, 304, 23 Eng. Rep. 437, 453, 485 (Ch. 1684).
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as follows: To H for life, then to W for life, income to the eldest
son of H and W until he attains his majority, at which time the
entire property is to be distributed to him, but if he dies before
attaining his majority, then to A and his heirs. H died survived
by W, who then was pregnant. The child (a son) was born in due
course, but died six weeks thereafter. Upon the validity of the
executory devise to A being challenged in Chancery, the court
held it to be good, stating simply, "That all the Remainders and
Contingencies in the Deed of Trust, being limited and confined
to fall within the Compass of twenty-one Years, are good
...
,"5 It should be noted, however, despite the court's brevity,
that its opinion apparently was based on the argument of A's
counsel,
that here was no danger of a perpetuity, being the contingency must of necessity happen within the space of twentyone years at most after the decease of either . . . [H or M:
and this cannot be said to come nearer a perpetuity
than almost every settlement of a real estate; for here, if the
issue [eldest son of H and W once attains his full age, then
the whole term is to be assigned unto him, and he may dispose of it at his pleasure. . .
This follows from the fact that A's counsel based their argument
upon Wood v. Sanders,"7 which previously had been used by Lord
Nottingham as one of the grounds for his decision in The Duke
of Norfolk's Case," 8 since the Lord Keeper stated, in approving
the decision of the judges in Massingberd, that Massingberdwas
115. 2 Ch. Rep. 275, 282-283, 21 Eng. Rep. 677, 679 (Ch. 1684). Substantially the
same language appeared in the report of this case sub nom. Massenburgh v. Ash, in 1
Vern. at 304, 23 Eng. Rep. at 485 (Ch. 1684):
"[Tihe Judges having unanimously given their opinion, that the contingent limitation over to the plaintiff [A] was good, for this reason; because the contingent
limitation was circumscribed, and must happen within the space of 21 years. . .the
Lord Keeper declared himself fully satisfied with the opinion of the Judges, and
decreed for the plaintiff [A]; and said, he took this case to be the same with the
case of Wood and Saunders ....
116. 1 Vern. 234, 236, 23 Eng. Rep. 437 (Ch. 1684).
117. 1 Ch. Cas. 131, 22 Eng. Rep. 728 (Ch. 1669).
118. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 35-36, 40, and 51, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 952-953, 955, and 961 (Ch.
1682). In fact, Lord Chancellor Nottingham stated, in 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 51, 22 Eng. Rep. 931,
961 (Ch. 1682):
[N]o Art or Reason can distinguish [Wood v. Sanders, 1 Ch. Cas. 131, 22 Eng.
Rep. 728 (Ch. 1669)] from our Case. . . .Wood and Saunder's [sic] Case is this:
To the Husband for sixty Years, if he lived so long; to the Wife for sixty Years, if
she lived so long, then if John be living at the Time of the Death of the Father and
Mother, then to John; but if he die without Issue, living Father or Mother, then to
Edward. . . . How came it then to be adjudged good? Because it was a Remainder
upon a Contingency, that was to happen during two Lives, which was but a short
Contingency, and the law might very well expect the Happening of it?
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"the same with the case of Wood and Saunders [sic]. .. .

Examination of the decisions holding that the vesting of an
interest validly can be postponed for lives in being at its creation
plus the actual minority of one other than the person to whom it
was limited demonstrates that they so held because, by limitation
in marriage settlements at common law, one could validly limit
property to his wife for life, remainder "to the first and other sons
of the marriage in tail, and until the person to whom the last
remainder is limited is of age the estate is unalienable.' 20 In
Stanley, for example, the court justified holding such a postponement of vesting to be valid on the ground that it would "prevent
the power of alienation no longer than the law would do if there
were no such contingency expressed .

..,2"
". It would appear

from these decisions, however, that, in determining the maximum allowable duration of the period within which an interest
must vest in order for it to be valid, the courts must have been
thinking in terms of a period equal in duration to the maximum
time for which alienation theoretically might be suspended by
common law settlement (i.e., lives in being plus 21 years), rather
than in terms of a period identical to the period for which alienation could be suspended by common law settlement (i.e., lives in
being plus the actual minority of the person to whom the interest
over is limited). 2 2 For, on their facts, these cases involved not

only postponements of vesting for a period which was not identical to the period for which alienation could be suspended by
common law settlement, but also, as in the case of a 21 year
period in gross, a potential suspension of the power of alienation
for longer than the period allowable at common law, since the
ultimate taker himself could have been a minor when his interest
vested. And, in at least three of these cases, as heretofore indicated,' 2 the maximum permissible period for suspension of vest24
ing in fact is said to be a period of lives in being plus 21 years.
119. Massenburgh v. Ash, 1 Vern. 304, 23 Eng. Rep. 485 (Ch. 1684).
120. Long v. Blackall, 7 Term Rep. 100, 102, 101 Eng. Rep. 875, 877 (K.B. 1797).
See text accompanying notes 102, 111, and 114-119 supra; E. COKE, supra note 4, at
20.a.n.5 and 271.b.n.l.V; W. LEWIS, supra note 4, at 133.
121. See Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms.686, 692, 24 Eng. Rep. 917, 919 (Ch. 1732).
122. See Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms.686, 24 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1732), which cited
Lloyd v. Carew, Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H. L. 1697) as authority for its
decision. But see Goodtitle v. Wood, Willes 211, 214, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1138 (Com. P1.
1740), wherein the Court said: "With regard to the case of Marks v.Marks...which was
cited in the arguments, though it is a very good authority, yet as it was determined on a
principle not applicable to this case, there is no occasion to pray it in aid of the present
case."
123. Text accompanying notes 112, 113, and 115 supra.
124. Gulliver v. Wickett, 1 Wils. K.B. 105, 106, 95 Eng. Rep. 517, 518 (K.B. 1745)
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It would appear, moreover, from Beard v. Westcott, 15 that
postponement of the vesting of an interest for lives in being plus
the actual minority of one other than the person to whom the
interest was limited was in fact considered to be equivalent to the
postponement of vesting for lives in being plus a 21 year period
in gross. Beard involved a testamentary limitation which, as simplified, has been stated as follows:
to A. for 99 years, if he so long live, remainder to the first
son of A. (then unborn,) for 99 years, if he so long live, and
so on in tail male to such first son lawfully issuing for ever.
And for want and in default of such issue of such first son,
to the second and other sons [of A] successively for 99 years
only in case he so long live. . .and if there should be no issue
male of A. at the time of his (A's) death, or in case there
should be such issue male at that time, and they should all
die before 21 without issue male, then to B. for 99 years if
he should so long live, remainder to the first son of B. for 99
years, if he should so long live, & c. 12
A survived the testator, having theretofore attained the age of 21,
and brought a proceeding in Chancery to determine both the
nature of the interest created in him by the above limitation and
the validity of the other interests thereby created. The Master of
the Rolls referred the case to the Court of Common Pleas for its
opinion. This court, in 1812, held valid the limitations to A, his
first son, and B etc., and voided the intermediate limitations to
the second and other sons of A, without, however, setting forth
the reasons for its decision.2' Whereupon,
The Master of the Rolls, in consequence of what Lord Alvan(wherein the court said, "here is ... a devise over, which we hold a good executory devise,
as it is to commence within 21 years after a life in being .. ");Goodtitle v. Wood, Willes
211, 213, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1137 (Com. Pl. 1740) (wherein the court said, "the rule has
in many instances been extended to twenty-one years after the death of a person in being,
as in that case likewise there is no danger of a perpetuity."); Massingberd v. Ash, 2 Ch.
Rep. 275, 21 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 1684), also reported sub nom. Massenburgh v. Ash, 1
Vern. 234, 257, 304, 23 Eng. Rep. 437, 453, 485 (Ch. 1684) (wherein the court said "That
all the Remainders and Contingencies . . .being limited and confined to fall within the
Compass of twenty-one Years, are good ..
").
125. 5 Taunt. 393, 128 Eng. Rep. 741 (Com. Pl. 1812, 1813) (on reference from
Chancery), conflicting opinion given by Court of King's Bench on subsequent reference
from Chancery, 5 B. & Ald. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1822), decision of the Court of
King's Bench confirmed by the Lord Chancellor, Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng. Rep. 1002 (Ch.
1822).
126. Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393, 128 Eng. Rep. 741, at 742 (Com. P1. 1812,
1813) (emphasis added).
127. 5 Taunt. 393, 406, 128 Eng. Rep. 741, 747 (Com. Pl. 1812).
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ley M.R. had said in Thelusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. jun. 377,
"That the period of 21 years had never been considered as a
term that might at all events be added to such executory
devise or trust;" entertained doubts whether this Court had
not gone too far in holding all the limitations good that could
take place during a life or lives in being, or within 21 years
afterwards, and therefore ordered that the Court should be
again attended with the case, with the following additional
question. How far the limitations over in the event. . . they
[A's male issue] should all die before they attained their
respective ages of 21 years without lawful issue male, were
affected by the circumstance, that they [the limitations
over] were to take effect at the end of an absolute term of
21 years after a life in being at the death of the testator,
without reference to the infancy of the person intended to
take, or by the circumstance that there might be issue of
[A] living at his death. . .who would be incapable of taking
according to the above certificate, for
whose death under 21,
28
the limitation over. . .must await?
Upon reargument of the case before the Court of Common
Pleas, the invalidity of the limitations over to B etc. was urged
on two grounds. First,
that the term of 21 years after the termination of a life or
lives in being is not given by the law for the vesting of an
estate, unless the term have reference to the coming of age
of the unborn child, in whom it is to vest; it cannot be added,
as a term in gross, to the duration of the life or lives in

being. 129
Second, that
[if]. . .the son of [A] had had a son, that person, being the
unborn son of an unborn son, could take no estate, . . .
[and] the limitation to him would prevent the limitation
over to [B] from taking effect, for he [B] is not to take
except in the event that the grandson of [A], taking an
estate, should die under twenty-one; whereas that grandson
never takes any estate at all, and there is nothing to support
the limitation to [B], unless the interposition is allowed of
13"
a term in gross ...
128.
129.
130.

5 Taunt. 393, 407-408, 128 Eng. Rep. 741, 747 (Corn. P1. 1812).
5 Taunt. 393, 408, 128 Eng. Rep. 741, 748 (Corn. P1. 1812).
5 Taunt. 393, 409, 128 Eng. Rep. 741, 748 (Corn. P1. 1812).
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The Court of Common Pleas thereupon reaffirmed its prior decision without opinion, stating only:
we are of opinion that the limitations over in the event.
they [A's male issue] shall all die before they attain
their respective ages of 21 years without lawful male issue,
are not affected by the circumstance that they are to
take effect at the end of an absolute term of 21 years after a
life in being at the death of the testator without reference to
the infancy of the person intended to take, nor by the circumstance that there may be issue of [A] living at his death
. . . who would be incapable of taking according to the
former certificate . . . for whose death under 21, the limitation over . . . must await.''
The Lord Chancellor, apparently dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Common Pleas in Beard, referred the case to
the Court of King's Bench for its opinion. The invalidity of the
limitations over to B etc. was urged before the Court of King's
Bench on the same two grounds as it was urged on reargument
before the Court of Common Pleas. Like the Court of Common
Pleas, the Court of King's Bench rendered its decision without
opinion, holding that A had an estate for 99 years, determinable
with his life, and that upon A's death, his oldest son him surviving would take an estate for 99 years, determinable with his life,
but that "all the limitations subsequent and expectant upon the
limitation to the first son of [A], are void."'' 2 Whereupon, counsel for B contended before the Lord Chancellor
that it could not be collected from their [Court of King's
Bench] certificate, whether the circumstance that the limitations were to take effect at the end of a term of 21 years,
without reference to the infancy of the person intended to
take, created such a suspense of the vesting as to render the
33
limitations void.'
The Lord Chancellor then confirmed the decision of the Court of
King's Bench, stating that "[i]t is impossible that the Court of
' 34
King's Bench should not have considered that point.'
Beard is important for two reasons. First, as previously
stated, it indicates that a postponement of vesting after lives in
being for the actual minority of one other than the person to
131.
132.
133.
134.

5 Taunt. 393, 413-414, 128 Eng. Rep. 741, 749-750 (Corn. P1. 1813).
5 B. & Ald. 801, 815, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383, 1388 (K.B. 1822).
Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng. Rep. 1002, 1003 (Ch. 1822).
Turn. & R. 25, 26, 37 Eng. Rep. 1002, 1003 (Ch. 1822).
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whom an interest was limited was considered to be equivalent to
a postponement of vesting after lives in being for a 21 year period
in gross. Second, despite the fact that the result in Beard was the
invalidation of a limitation which postponed vesting for lives in
being plus the actual minority of one other than the person to
whom the interest in question was limited, Beard cannot be said
to hold that the limitation therein was invalid because of such
postponement of vesting. On the contrary, despite the belief of
the Lord Chancellor that "[ilt is impossible that the Court of
King's Bench should not have considered that point,"' 35 it would
appear that
the foundation of their [Court of King's Bench] certificate
was, that a previous limitation [to the second and other sons
of A], clearly too remote, and which was so considered by
the Court of Common Pleas, made those limitations [to B
etc.] also void which the Common Pleas had held good. The
subsequent limitations were considered as being void, not
from any infirmity existing in themselves [i.e., not because
they postponed vesting for twenty-one years in gross after
lives in being], but from the infirmity existing in the preceding limitation; and because that was a limitation too remote,
3
the others were considered as being too remote also. 1
Such, at least, was the opinion of Baron Bayley, as expressed in
37
his delivery of the opinion of the judges in Cadell v. Palmer.'
And, it should be noted, Baron Bayley not only sat upon the
Court of King's Bench when Beard was decided, but in fact
signed the certificate given by the Court of King's Bench in that
case.

38

It thus would seem that, at least as early as 1684,'9 and
almost consistently thereafter, the courts considered the permissible period of the Rule to be at least equal in duration to the
maximum time for which alienation theoretically might be suspended by common law settlement (i.e., lives in being plus a
period of 21 years), rather than limited to a period identical to
the period for which alienation could be suspended by common
law settlement (i.e., lives in being plus the actual minority of the
person to whom the interest over is limited). This clearly appears
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
sub nom.
(dictum).

Id.
Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 420, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 974 (H. L. 1833).
Id.
See 5 B. & Aid. 801, 815, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383, 1388 (K.B. 1822).
Massingberd v. Ash, 2 Ch. Rep. 275, 21 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 1684), also reported,
Massenburgh v.Ash, I Vern. 234, 257, 304, 23 Eng. Rep. 437, 453, 485 (Ch. 1684)
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from the cases upholding the validity of an interest whose vesting
is postponed for lives in being at its creation plus the actual
minority of one other than the person to whom the interest is
limited.14 0 This is particularly apparent when these cases are
viewed in light of the fact that, not only was such postponement
apparently considered to be equivalent to one for lives in being
plus a period of 21 years in gross,' but, all but one of these cases
in fact were decided subsequent to the establishment of the principle that an interest is not void for remoteness if it must vest, if
at all, within a reasonable period in gross after lives in being at
its creation.' It further appears from dicta in a number of cases
decided between 1759 and 1833,'13 to the effect that
limitations. . .are void, unless they necessarily vest, if at all,
within a life or lives in being and 21 years or 9 or 10 months
afterwards. This has been sanctioned by the opinion of
judges of all times, from the time of the Duke of Norfolk's
case to the present: it is grown reverend by age, and is not
1
now to be broken in upon ....
140. Text accompanying notes 120-138 supra. See Gulliver v. Wickett, 1 Wils. K.B.
105, 95 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1745) (dictum); Goodtitle v. Wood, Wiles 211, 125 Eng. Rep.
1136 (Com. P1. 1740) (dictum); Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P. Wms. 686, 24 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.
1732) (by inference); Maddox v. Staines, 2 P. Wins. 421, 24 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1727) (by
inference), aff'd sub nom. Staines v. Maddox, 3 Bro. P.C. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 1209 (H. L.
1728); Massingberd v. Ash, 2 Ch. Rep. 275, 21 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 1684), also reported,
sub nom. Massenburgh v. Ash, 1 Vern 234, 257, 304, 23 Eng. Rep. 437,453, 485 (Ch. 1684)
(dictum). Cf. Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393, 128 Eng. Rep. 741 (Com. Pl. 1812, 1813)
(on reference from Chancery), conflicting opinion given by Court of King's Bench on
subsequent reference from Chancery, 5 B. & Aid. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1822),
decision of the Court of King's Bench confirmed by the Lord Chancellor, Turn. & R. 25,
37 Eng. Rep. 1002 (Ch. 1822).
141. Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393, 128 Eng. Rep. 741 (Com. Pl. 1812, 1813) (on
reference from Chancery), conflicting opinion given by Court of King's Bench on subsequent reference from Chancery, 5 B. & Aid. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383 (K.B. 1822), decision
of the Court of King's Bench confirmed by the Lord Chancellor, Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng.
Rep. 1002 (Ch. 1822); text accompanying notes 124-138 supra. See Stanley v. Leigh, 2 P.
Wms. 686, 24 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch. 1732); J. Gray, supra note 2, § 180 & n.1. But See
Goodtitle v. Wood, Willes 211, 214, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1138 (Com. P1. 1740).
142. See cases cited notes 68-119 supra, and accompanying text; W. FRATCHER, supra
note 29, at 270, 271; 3 L. SIMzs & A. SMITH, supra note 2, § 1215.
143. Wilkinson v. South, 7 Term Rep. 555, 101 Eng. Rep. 1129 (K.B. 1798); Long v.
Blackall, 7 Term Rep. 100, 101 Eng. Rep. 875(K.B. 1797); Goodman v. Goodright, 2 Burr.
870, 97 Eng. Rep. 608 (K.B. 1759); Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 652, 127 Eng.
Rep. 351 (Com. P1. 1804) (printed as a note to Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 643, 127 Eng.
Rep. 347 (Com. Pl. 1804)); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch.
1799) (opinions of Lawrence, J. and Buller, J.), affd, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030
(H. L. 1805); Blandford v. Thackerell, 2 Ves. Jr. 238, 30 Eng. Rep. 612 (Ch. 1793) (which
involved postponement of vesting after lives in being for the actual minority of the person
to whom the interest in question was limited); Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep.
1186 (Ch. 1787).
144. Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 325, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186, 1187 (Ch. 1793). Accord, Long

270
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Consequently, it would seem that, at the time as of which the
common law was received here, the 21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule was potentially, if not actually, a period
in gross unrelated to any actual minority. Certainly, it would
appear to have been, at that time, actually a period in gross in
that it did not have to be related to the minority of the person to
whom the interest was limited. These conclusions, moreover, are
fortified by the opinions of two of the most authoritative legal
commentators of that time. Thus, Blackstone, writing in 1766,
states that
in. . .executory devises, the contingencies ought to be such
as may happen within a reasonable time; as within one or
more life or lives in being, or within a moderate term of
years. . . . The utmost length that has been hitherto allowed, for the contingency of an executory devise. . .to happen in, is that of a life or lives in being, and one and twenty
years afterwards."'
Although the only example given by Blackstone was one in which
vesting was postponed for the actual minority of the person to
whom the interest was limited,'4 6 it has been said of Blackstone's
statement of the permissible period of the Rule that, "by stating
it generally, as he did, he must have considered 21 years generally, independently of minority, as the rule."' 47
Fearne, moreover, commences his exhaustive study of executory devises by stating that,
the case of a limitation to one for life, and from and after the
expiration of one day (or any other supposed period, not
exceeding 21 years we may suppose) next ensuing his decease, then over to another, may be adduced as an instance
of the call. . .to which I have opened the second branch of
v. Blackall, 7 Term Rep. 100, 102, 101 Eng. Rep. 875, 877 (K.B. 1797). Accord, as to the
maximum permissible period of the Rule, Wilkinson v. South, 7 Term Rep. 555, 558, 101
Eng. Rep. 1129, 1130 (K.B. 1798); Goodman v. Goodright, 2 Burr. 870, 879, 97 Eng. Rep.
608, 611 (K.B. 1759); Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 652, 655, 127 Eng. Rep. 351,
353 (Com. P1. 1804) (printed as a note to Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 643, 127 Eng. Rep.
347 (Com. Pl. 1804)); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 314 (opinion of Lawrence
J.), 324 and 327 (opinion of Buller J.), 31 Eng. Rep. 160, 164 and 166 (Ch. 1799), aff'd, 11
Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H. L. 1805); Blandford v. Thackerell, 2 Ves. Jr. 238, 241242, 30 Eng. Rep. 612, 614 (Ch. 1793) (which involved postponement of vesting after lives
in being for the actual minority of the person to whom the interest in question was
limited).
145. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 173-174.
146.

See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 174.

147.

Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 418, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 973 (H. L. 1833).
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the general distribution of executory devises. 4 '
He then proceeds to state:
[T]he law appears to be now settled, that an executory
devise, either of a real or personal estate, which must, in the
nature of the limitation, vest within twenty-one years after
the period of a life in being, is good; and this appears to be
the longest period yet allowed for the vesting of such es"'
tates. 49
And, finally, it is clear that the House of Lords, in deciding
Cadel v. Palmer,'0 did so in the belief that the 21 year element
of the permissible period of the Rule was potentially, if not actually, a period in gross, unrelated to any actual minority, as
early as 1740, or, perhaps, as early as 1697. The limitation in
Cadell postponed the vesting of the ultimate interest limited over
for 28 lives in being at the creation of such interest plus a period
of 20 years thereafter, limited as a term in gross without reference
to the infancy of any person. The House of Lords upheld the
validity of the ultimate interest limited over, the opinion of Baron
Bayley stating:
Upon the direct authority, therefore of the decision of the
Court of Common Pleas, in Beard v. Westcott. . .and the
dicta by L. C. Justice Willes [in 1740], 1 1 Lord Mansfield'52
and Lord Kenyon,15 3 and the rules laid down in Blackstone
and Fearne, we consider ourselves warranted in saying that
the limit is a life or lives in being, and 21 years afterwards,
without reference to the infancy of any person whatever.
This will certainly render the estate unalienable for 21 years
after lives in being, but. . .it will not tie up the alienation
an unreasonable length of time.'54
148. 2 C. FEARNE, supra note 4, at *26. This passage is quoted from the 5th edition,
printed in 1796. However, according to Baron Bayley, this opinion of Fearne appeared in
all prior editions of his work, commencing with the first edition in 1773. Cadell v. Palmer,
1 Cl. & F. 372, 419, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 974 (H.L. 1833).
149. 2 C. FEARNE, supra note 4, at *83-*84 (321). Similar statements are made by
Fearne elsewhere in his work. E.g., 2 C. FEARNE, supra note 4, at *77 (318), *185 (355),
*415- *421. These opinions of Fearne likewise are said to have appeared in all prior editions
of his work, commencing with the first edition in 1773. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372,
419, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 974 (H.L. 1833).
150. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
151. In Goodtitle v. Wood, Willes 211,213, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1137 (Com. P1. 1740).
152. In Goodman v. Goodright, 2 Burr. 870, 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 608, 611 (K.B. 1759).
153. In Wilkinson v. South, 7 Term Rep. 555, 558, 101 Eng. Rep. 1129, 1130 (K.B.
1798); Long v. Blackall, 7 Term Rep. 100, 102, 101 Eng. Rep. 875, 877 (K.B. 1797); Jee v.
Audley, 1 Cox 324, 325, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186, 1187 (Ch. 1793).
154. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 421, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 974 (H.L. 1833).
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The Lord Chancellor, moreover, in successfully moving the adoption by the House of Lords of Baron Bayley's above-quoted opinion, said:
That rule [that an interest must vest, if at all, within lives
in being and 21 years afterwards without reference to the
infancy of any person] was originally introduced in consequence of the infancy of parties; but whatever was its beginning, it is now to be taken as established by the dicta of the
Judges from time to time. A decision of your Lordships. ..in
Lloyd v. Carew [in 1697]. . .settled the rule; for the whole
question was there gone into.'55
In fact, the only basis for doubting that the 21 year element
of the permissible period of the Rule was potentially a period in
gross unrelated to any actual minority, as of the time of our
reception of the English common law, is an erroneous belief. To
wit, that the first extension of the permissible period of the Rule
beyond lives in being at the creation of the interest in question
was established in 1736, in Stephens v. Stephens,' 6 "to cover the
case where the person to whom it [the interest in question] was
limited was a posthumous child or a minor."' 5 7 This belief led to
numerous dicta, to the effect that vesting of an interest may be
postponed for 21 years after lives in being at its creation only to
permit the person to whom such interest is limited to attain his
58
majority.
The limitation involved in Stephens was by will: To my
grandson, W, and his heirs, but if W shall die under the age of
21, then to such other son of the body of my daughter, M, as shall
attain his age of 21, and his heirs (with limitations over in default
of such issue). The testator died survived by W and M. W thereafter died prior to attaining his age of 21. Some years after the
155. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 422, 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 975 (H.L. 1833) (emphasis added).
156. Cas. Temp. Talb. 228, 25 Eng. Rep. 751 (Ch. 1736).
157. 7 W. Holdsworth, supra note 2, at 226 (emphasis added). Accord, Doe v. Fonnereau, 2 Dougl. 487, 508, 99 Eng. Rep. 311, 325 (K.B. 1780).
158. Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 143, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1042
(H.L.1805); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 331, 337, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 168, 171
(Ch. 1799) (opinion of Alvanley, M.R.), afl'd, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L.
1805). See Long v. BlackalI, 7 Term Rep. 100, 102, 101 Eng. Rep. 875, 877 (K.B. 1797)
(possibly-by implication); Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393, 407-408, 128 Eng. Rep. 741,
747 (Com. Pl. 1812) (on reference from Chancery), conflicting opinion given by Court of
King's Bench on subsequent reference from Chancery, 5 B. & Aid. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383
(K.B. 1822), decision of the Court of King's Bench confirmed by the Lord Chancellor,
Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng. Rep. 1002 (Ch. 1822); Marlborough v. Godolphin, 1 Eden 404, 418419, 422, 28 Eng. Rep. 741, 746-747, 748 (Ch. 1759).
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death of W, another son (T) was born to M. The question then
was raised of the validity of the limitations over after the death
of W. The court upheld their validity, saying:
[W]e do not find any case wherein an executory devise of a
freehold hath been held good, which hath suspended the
vesting of the estate until a son unborn should attain his age
of twenty-one years, except the case of Taylor and
Bydall. .

.

. yet upon the authority of that judgment, and

its conformity to several late determinations in cases of
terms for years, and considering that the power of alienation
will not be restrained longer than the law would restrain it,
viz. during the infancy of the first taker, which cannot reasonably be said to extend to a perpetuity. . .we are of opinion, that the devise before mentioned [to T] may be good
by way of executory devise. 5 '
Four facts, however, must be noted in connection with
Stephens. First, it apparently was the earliest case to determine
the validity of a postponement of vesting for lives in being plus
the actual minority of the ultimate taker."' Second, it was decided in 1736, subsequent to the decisions of the House of Lords
159. Cas. Temp. Talb. 228, 232, 25 Eng. Rep. 751, 752 (Ch. 1736). Taylor v. Biddall,
2 Mod. 289, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078 (Com. P1. 1679), upon which the court in Stephens based
its decision, involved a limitation which, in form, can be stated: to A until her son B
attains the age of 21, then to B and his heirs, but if B dies before attaining the age of 21,
then to the heirs of C's body and their heirs when they attain their respective ages of 21.
B died under the age of 21, and the question then was raised of the validity of the interest
limited to the heirs of C's body. The court held in favor of the claimant of the interest
limited to the heirs of C's body. It is important, however, to note that the successful party
in this case was the heir at law of B, (and thus entitled to inherit the property from B if
the executory interest over was void and if, as a result, B had a fee simple absolute) as
well as the sole heir of C's body. For, the ground of the court's decision is not clear. As
Chief Justice North stated: "In this case a fee did vest in [B] presently, and therefore
after his death without issue the descendant [the successful party] is his heir, and hath
a good title; if not as heir at law, yet she may take by way of executory devise as heir of
" 2 Mod. 289, 292-293, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078, 1080 (Com. P1.
the body of her father ....
1679).
160. The only earlier cases found, which apparently involved a postponement of
vesting for lives in being plus the actual minority of the taker of the ultimate interest,
are Taylor v. Biddall, 2 Mod. 289, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078 (Com. P1. 1679), discussed in note
159 supra, and Snowe v. Cutler, 1 Lev. 135, 83 Eng. Rep. 335 (K.B. 1664). The limitation
in Snowe was: To the heirs of Ws body, if they attain the age of 14 years. W was alive,
but had no issue, at the time the interest was created. Although this limitation, on its
face, involves a possible postponement of vesting for two-thirds of the actual minority of
the executory devisees after a life in being at the creation of the interest, the case cannot
be said to decide the validity of such a postponement. For, in the first place, the court
was equally divided on the validity of the gift to the heirs of W's body, in consequence of
which no judgment was given. And, secondly, the court seemed to view the problem solely
as one of whether a limitation to an infant en ventre sa mere is good-and appeared to
believe that the interest would vest in each child of W on birth, if at all.
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in Lloyd v. Carew6 ' and Staines v. Maddox' although it did not
specifically refer to either of them. In fact, neither Lloyd nor
Staines, nor any pre-1736 case following either of them, is mentioned in any of the cases which, by dictum, purport to limit
postponement of vesting to lives in being plus the actual minority
of the taker of the postponed interest. 6 ' Third, the decree in
Stephens was rendered by the Court of Chancery, not the House
of Lords. And, fourth, the holding in Stephens cannot, on its
facts, be said to preclude a greater permissible period of the Rule
than it held to exist, particularly in light of the subsequent decisions in Goodtitlel4 and Gulliver.6 5 Consequently, the proper
chronology of the evolution of the maximum permissible period
of the Rule is as follows: first, lives in being at the creation of the
interest; second, lives in being plus a reasonable period in gross;
third, lives in being plus the actual minority of one other than the
person to whom the interest in question is limited (which was
considered to be equivalent to a period in gross of 21 years);
fourth, lives in being plus the actual minority of the person to
whom the interest is limited (a period which necessarily is permissible in light of the prior validation of a period equal to. lives
in being plus the actual minority of one other than the person to
whom the interest is limited); fifth, lives in being plus a period
in gross of 21 years, unrelated to any actual minority. And, since
the second and third developments in the evolution of the permissible period of the Rule both occurred prior to the time as of which
we received the English common law, it seems clear that, at such
time, the 21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule
was potentially, if not actually, a period in gross unrelated to any
actual minority. This conclusion, moreover, is supported by those
United States cases which have considered the extent to which
we have adopted the Rule as part of our received common law.
ADOPTION OF THE RULE IN THE UNrrED STATES

Examination of the judicial adoption, in the United States,
of the common law rule against perpetuities 66 demonstrates that
161. Show. Parl. Cas. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (H.L. 1697).
162. 3 Bro. P.C. 108, 1 Eng. Rep. 1209 (H.L. 1728), aff'g Maddox v. Staines, 2 P.
Wins. 421, 24 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1727).
163. See cases cited note 158 supra.
164. Goodtitle v. Wood, Willes 211, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 (Com. P1. 1740), discussed
in text accompanying notes 109 and 112 supra.
165. Gulliver v. Wickett, 1 Wils. K.B. 105, 95 Eng. Rep. 517 (K.B. 1745), discussed
in text accompanying notes 110 and 113 supra.
166. As indicated in the text accompanying note 32 supra, the common law rule
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the 21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule generally
is, and, with few exceptions, always has been, considered as actually or potentially a period in gross, unrelated to any actual
minority, at the time as of which the common law was received
here. In three jurisdictions,'67 in fact, it has been held that the 21
year element of the permissible period of the Rule is a period in
gross, unconnected with any actual minority, because the rule in
Cadell v. Palmer' 8 was in esse, so to speak, at the time as of which
the common law was received there. And, in at least eleven other
jurisdictions,'69 there is authoritative dicta to the same effect.
against perpetuities entered our jurisprudence by virtue of our general reception of the
English common law. J. GRAY,supra note 2, § 200. E.g., Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45
P. 391 (1896); Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924); Barton v. Thaw,
246 Pa. 348, 92 A. 312 (1914); Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90,91 N.W. 87 (1902) (dictum).
See 1 AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 1.40; 1 J. KENT, supra note 4, at *470*473; 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMIH, supra note 2, § 1221 (by implication).
167. Pearce v. Pearce, 199 Ala. 491, 74 So. 952 (1917) (by implication); Beverlin v.
First Nat. Bank in Wichita, 151 Kan. 307, 98 P.2d 200 (1940) (by implication); Keeler v.
Lauer, 73 Kan. 388, 85 P. 541 (1906) (by implication as dictum); First Camden Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Collins, 114 N.J.E. 59, 168 A. 275 (Ct. Errors & Appeals N.J. 1933) (by
implication). But see McEwen v. Enoch, 167 Kan. 119, 204 P.2d 736 (1949). In Alabama,
it should be noted, in a decision subsequent to Pearce v. Pearce, supra, but likewise
holding that the 21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule is a period in gross,
unconnected with any actual minority, the court stated, in support of its holding: "[tihat
the term of years (under the English rule 21 years, and 9 months when the interest
of. . .[a child en ventre sa mere] is involved) may be taken in gross without reference to
any infancy. .. was settled in Cadell v. Palmer. . .and has not been questioned in
America.
Crawford v. Carlisle, 206 Ala. 379, at 387, 89 So. 565, 573 (1921) (emphasis
added).
168. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
169. Towle v. Doe, 97 Me. 427, 54 A. 1072 (1903) (wherein the court stated that
"[tihe common law rule is recognized by the courts of this state, as formulated in Cadell
v. Palmer ..
" Id. at 431, 54 A. at 1074 (1903)); Safe Deposit & Trust Company v.
Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 103-105, 179 A. 536, 541-542 (1935) (by implication); Congdon v.
Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N.W. 76 (1924) (wherein the court stated:
Of course the common law applies to our state. . . .[Flor the purpose of this case,
it is the same whether the common law of England which became of force in this
country may be said to be the common law at the time of the Revolution or whether
it was the common law of England in force at the time of the Ordinance of
1787 . ..
Under the old law alienation might be suspended for any number of lives in
being and 21 years, and, of course, for 21 years as a distinct period, independent of
lives. This was settled by Cadell v. Palmer. . . .While this decision was made after
the adoption of the New York statute. . .the principle was previously regarded as
generally received.
Id. at 362, 364, 200 N.W.at 82, 83 (1924)); Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v.
Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142 (1855) (by implication, the court stating:
It has therefore long been the settled rule in England, and adopted as part of the
common law of this commonwealth, that all limitations, by way of executory devise,
which may not take effect within the term of a life or lives in being at the death of
the testator, and twenty one years afterwards, as a term in gross. . .are void as too
remote, and tending to create perpetuities. . . . See also Cadell v.
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This position, moreover, has been taken in full awareness of the
fact that the 21 year element of the permissible period of the Rule
was considered to have been introduced originally to provide for
an actual minority. 7 0
Palmer... which contains a very full and elaborate history and discussion of the
cases on this subject.
Id. at 152 (1855) (emphasis added)); Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879)
(wherein the court stated:
Under the old law alienation might be suspended for any number of lives in being
and twenty-one years, and of course for twenty-one years as a distinct period,
independent of lives. This was settled in Cadell v. Palmer. . . . This decision was
not made until several years after the adoption of the New York Revised Statutes,
although its principle was previously regarded as generally received.
Id. at 571, 2 N.W. at 826 (1879) (emphasis added)). St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294
(1852) (by implication); Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61, 114 (N.Y. Ct. for the Correction
of Errors 1836) (by implication); Penfield v. Tower, 1 N.D. 216, 46 N.W. 413 (1890) (by
implication); Barton v. Thaw , 246 Pa. 348, 92 A. 312 (1914) (by implication, the court
stating:
twenty-one years were added [to the permissible period of the Rule] to provide for
the minority of children in esse at the expiration of the life estate. Later the consideration of minority was lost sight of, and the period of twenty-one years was allowed
in gross, without reference to an existing minority. The rule was developed entirely
at common law. It was brought to America as part of the common law of England,
and is imbedded in the common law of Pennsylvania. . . . The question was settled in the House of Lords, in England, in Cadell v. Palmer ...
Id. at 352, 355, 92 A. at 313, 314 (1914)); Brown v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 277, 6 S.W. 869 (1888)
(by implication); Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902); McArthur v. Scott,
113 U.S. 340 (1884) (by implication, the court stating:
The rule of the common law, by which an estate devised must at all events vest
within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards, has reference to time
and not to persons. Even the 'life or lives in being' have no reference to the persons
who are to take, for the testator is allowed to select, as the measure of time, the
lives of any persons now in existence; and the 'twenty-one years afterwards' are not
regulated by the birth or the coming of age of any person, for they begin, not with
a birth, but with a death, and are twenty-one years in gross, without regard to the
life, or to the coming of age, of any person soever. Cadell v. Palmer.
Id. at 383 (1884)).
170. See Pearce v. Pearce, 199 Ala. 491, 74 So. 952 (1917); Odell v. Odell, 92 Mass.
(10 Allen) 1 (1865) (wherein the court stated, on the authority of Proprietors of the Church
in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142 (1855), cited note 169 supra, that
[t]his limit [lives in being plus 21 years] is said to have been adopted by analogy
to the ordinary limitations in strict settlement for the life of a tenant in tail and
the possible minority of his heir; but the life or lives need not be those of any person
interested in the estate. . . nor need the term of twenty-one years refer to the
infancy of any person whatever.
Id. at 5 (1865)); Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 A. 312 (1914) (quoted in note 169 supra).
Compare Odell v. Odell, supra, and Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant,
supra, with the earlier case of Hawley v. The Inhabitants of Northampton, 8 Mass. (7
Tyng) *3 (1811) (wherein the court said:
"But the law will allow a devise of lands in fee simple to one, with an executory
devise over to another on a contingency, which must happen within the compass
of a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years and a few months after. The twentyone years are introduced to provide for the minority of a child born.
Id. at *37-*38 (1811) (dictum)).
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The clearest statement that Cadell was in esse at the time
as of which we received the common law is to be found in Becker
v. Chester.' Becker involved a proceeding for construction of a
will. The will, inter alia, divided the testator's residuary estate,
which consisted of both realty and personalty, into equal parts,
one for each of his children. In substance, each child was to get
the income from his share for his life; his surviving issue were to
receive the income from his share for the 21 years following his
death; and the corpus of his share was to be distributed 21 years
after his death to his then living issue, there being provisions for
alternate gifts over on failure of his issue at any time prior to
distribution. Wisconsin had a statute directed against suspension
of the power of alienation of realty, but had no such statute relating to personalty. The court held, alternatively, as follows: first,
that the provisions of the will did not suspend the power of alienation of realty under the Wisconsin statute, since the executors
were given the power to sell it at any time; second, that, in any
event, the realty of which the testator had died possessed had
been equitably converted into personalty by the terms of his will,
so that the statute prohibiting suspension of the power of alienation of realty would not apply; third, that enactment of a statute
prohibiting only suspension of the power of alienation of realty
abrogated the common law rule against perpetuities with respect
to personalty; but, fourth, that if it did not, the limitations in the
will in question clearly were valid under the common law rule
against perpetuities. In support of its fourth alternative holding,
the Wisconsin court said:
This is the proposition: If the trust were to be tested by the
common-law rule as to perpetuities, would it fail? That depends upon whether the twenty-one years of the rule is a
gross term and an existing period of gestation, or whether the
term refers to and is limited by existing infancy. There can
be no reasonable controversy at this late day, it would seem,
but that the prevailing idea in the home of the common law,
at the time it came to us, was that the term was a certain
period of twenty-one years and the period of gestation added,
though the rule was not distinctly formulated and settled in
the English courts till Cadell v. Palmer. . . . As we understand it, that decision, since it was promulgated, has been
accepted both in.England and in this country, not only as to
what the law of England is, but what it was when we took
therefrom the principles of the common law. . ..
171.

115 Wis. 90, 91 N. W. 87 (1902).
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The entire roll of the elementary writers, with one exception, might be successfully called as evidence of the recognized soundness of Cadell v. Palmer. . . . A study of those
authorities must convince any one, it would seem, that the
twenty-one years of the common law is an absolute term;
that Cadell v. Palmer did not promulgate any new rule, but
only brought into clear light the law as it had existed from
1
as early as 1766, at least ....
It should be noted, moreover, that an express statement, that
Cadell merely formulated explicitly a principle which in fact had
been established prior to our reception of the common law, is not
essential to recognition that such is the case. For, absent any
reference whatsoever to Cadell as its basis or origin, an express
holding that the 21 year element of the permissible period of the
Rule is a period in gross, unrelated to any actual minority, presupposes, by logical necessity, an implied holding that Cadell is
part of the jurisdiction's received common law. And, in at least
seventeen jurisdictions, it has been held or stated as dictum,
though without any reference to Cadell, that the 21 year element
of the permissible period of the Rule is a period in gross, unconnected with any actual minority.7 3 In five of these jurisdictions,
172. 115 Wis. 90, 131, 132, 91 N.W. 87, 102 (1902).
173. Henderson v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 250 Ala. 456, 34 So. 2d 835 (1948)
(holding); Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 145 A. 161 (1929) (holding); Hoadley v.
Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 93 A. 535 (1915) (holding) (no authority cited); Emerson v.
Campbell, 32 Del. Ch. 178, 84 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1951) (dictum) (no authority cited);
Murphy v. Johnston, 190 Ga. 23, 8 S.E. 2d. 23 (1940) (dictum); Fitchie v. Brown, 18 Haw.
52 (1906), afl'd, 211 U.S. 321 (1908) (holding) (no authority cited); Smith v. Kelley, 387
I1. 213, 56 N.E.2d 360 (1944) (holding); Smith v. Renne, 382 Ill. 26, 46 N.E.2d 587 (1943)
(holding); Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 A. 898 (1901) (holding); Kimball v. Crocker,
53 Me. 263 (1865) (holding); Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Company,
220 Md. 534, 155 A.2d 702 (1959) (holding by implication) (no authority cited); Loats
Female Orphan Asylum of Frederick City v. Essom, 220 Md. 11, 150 A.2d 742 (1959)
(holding by implication) (no authority cited); Marty v. First National Bank of Baltimore,
209 Md. 210, 120 A.2d 841 (1956) (holding by implication) (no authority cited); Billingsley
v. Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 171 A. 351 (1934) (holding by implication) (no authority cited);
Sutton v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company, 155 Md. 483, 142 A. 627 (1928) (holding, by
implication, on the facts; Rule not raised); Robinson v. Bonaparte, 102 Md. 63, 61 A. 212
(1905) (holding by implication) (no authority cited); Mercer v. Hopkins, 88 Md. 292, 41
A. 156 (1898) (holding, by implication on the facts; Rule not raised); Gardner v. City Nat.
Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934) (holding); In re Helme's Estate,
95 N.J.Eq. 197, 123 A. 43 (Prerog. Ct. N.J. 1923) (holding); Van Riper v. Hilton, 78
N.J.Eq. 371, 78 A. 1055 (N.J. Ch. 1911) (dictum); Farnan v. First Union National Bank,
263 N.C. 106, 139 S.E.2d 14 (1964) (holding); Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (Sup. Okla.
1967) (dictum); Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Ore. 585, 230 P. 554 (1924) (holding); In re
Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143, 116 A. 392 (1922) (holding); In re Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa.
179, 39 A. 879 (1898) (holding); Henderson v. Moore, 189 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1945), aff'd, 144 Tex. 398, 190 S.W.2d 800 (1945) (holding); Inglis v. Trustees of the
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in fact, subsequent cases indicated, by express reference to
Cadell, that it is part of their received common law.'
In Maryland, for example, despite some initial uncertainty
concerning the nature of the evil to be guarded against by the
Rule,' 75 its maximum permissible period uniformly has been considered to be "a life or lives in being at the time of its commencement and twenty-one years and a fraction of a year beyond to
cover the period of gestation ... .I"

Maryland, however, like

Sailor's Snug Harbour in the City of New York, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) *99 (1830) (holding);
Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941), rev'g Burdick v. Burdick, 33 F. Supp.
921 (D. D.C. 1940), cert. den. sub nom. Burdick v. Burdick, 315 U.S. 824 (1942) (holding).
174. Towle v. Doe, 97 Me. 427, 54 A. 1072 (1903), cited note 169 supra, was decided
subsequent to both Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 A. 898 (1901) and Kimball v.
Crocker, 53 Me. 263 (1865), both cited note 173 supra; Safe Deposit & Trust Company v.
Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935), cited note 169 supra, was decided subsequent to
Billingsley v. Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 171 A. 351 (1934), Sutton v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Company, 155 Md. 483, 142 A. 627 (1928), Robinson v. Bonaparte, 102 Md. 63, 61 A. 212
(1905), and Mercer v. Hopkins, 88 Md. 292, 41 A. 156 (1898), all of which are cited note
173 supra; First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Collins, 114 N.J.E. 59, 168 A. 275 (Ct.
Errors & Appeals N.J. 1933), cited note 167 supra, was decided subsequent to In re
Helme's Estate, 95 N.J.Eq. 197, 123 A. 43 (Prerog. Ct. N.J. 1923) and Van Riper v. Hilton,
78 N.J.Eq. 371, 78 A. 1055 (N.J. Ch. 1911), both cited note 173 supra; Barton v. Thaw,
246 Pa. 348, 92 A.312 (1914), cited note 169 supra, was decided subsequent to In re
Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179, 39 A. 879 (1898), cited note 173 supra; McArthur v. Scott
113 U.S. 340 (1884), cited note 169 supra, was decided subsequent to Inglis v. Trustees of
the Sailor's Snug Harbour in the City of New York, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) *99 (1830), cited note
173 supra.
175. Compare Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119 (Perkins' Annot. Ed.), 90 Am. Dec.
88 (1866) (holding that the Rule is concerned with the duration of restraints on alienation
as well as with remoteness of vesting) with Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 A. 1094
(1914), and Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36 (1904) (which settled
that, in Maryland as elsewhere, the Rule is directed solely against remoteness of vesting).
See Commonwealth Realty Corporation v. Bowers, 261 Md. 285, 274 A.2d 353 (1971); J.
GRAY, supra note 2, § 245.2; E. MILLER JR., supra note 2, §§ 317-321.
176. Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 275, 57 A. 609, 611 (1904). Accord, Ringgold
v. Carvel, 196 Md. 26, 76 A.2d 327 (1950); Perkins v. Inglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d 672
(1944); Deets v. Riggins, 176 Md. 520, 6 A.2d 239 (1939); Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md.
563, 89 A. 1094 (1914); Levenson v. Manly, 119 Md. 517, 87 A. 261 (1913); Missionary
Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Humphreys, 91 Md. 131, 46 A. 320 (1900);
In re Stickney's Will, 85 Md. 79, 36 A. 654 (1897); Starr v. The Minister and Trustees of
the Starr Methodist Protestant Church, 112 Md. 171, 76 A. 595 (1910); Thomas v. Gregg,
76 Md. 169, 24 A. 418 (1892); Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 A. 146 (1890); Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 418, 17 A. 329 (1889); Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352, 12 A. 11
(1888); Combs v. Combs, 67 Md. 11, 8 A. 757 (1887); Gambrill v. Forest Grove Lodge, 66
Md. 17, 5 A. 548, 10 A. 595 (1886); Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300 (1881); Goldsborough v.
Martin, 41 Md. 488 (1875); Deford v. Deford, 36 Md. 168 (1872); Wallis v. Woodland, 32
Md. 101 (1870); Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119 (Perkins' Annot. Ed.), 90 Am. Dec. 88
(1866); Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 (Md. 1834); Hoxton v. Archer, 3 G & J. 199 (Md.
1831); Dashiell v. Dashiell, 2 H. & G. 127 (Md. 1828); Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 111
(Md. 1827); Dallam v. Dallam's Lessee, 7 H. & J. 220 (Md. 1826). Accord, but phrased
differently, Barnitz's Lesee v. Casey, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 456 (1813) (error to the Circuit
Court for the District of Maryland); Commonwealth Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 261 Md. 285,
274 A.2d 353 (1971); Murphy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 236 Md. 282, 203
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most of the other jurisdictions presently affected by the problem,
never has expressly stated what it considers the 21 year elemept
of the permissible period of the Rule to represent. Even the basis
of the Rule's reception into Maryland's common law is obscure,
to say the least,' despite dicta7 8 from which it might be inferred
that Cadell v. Palmer7 ' is part of the Rule as it exists in Maryland.
Nonetheless, Maryland clearly considers the 21 year element
A.2d 889 (1964); Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 155
A.2d 702 (1959); Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A.2d 258 (1949); Chism v. Reese, 190 Md.
311, 58 A.2d 643 (1948); Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 52 A.2d 100 (1947);
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935); Turner v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 148 Md. 371, 129 A. 294 (1925); Ortman v. Dugan 130 Md. 121, 100
A. 82 (1917); Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md. 203, 94 A. 652 (1915); Gable v. Ellender, 53
Md. 311 (1880); Budd v. State, 22 Md. 48 (1864); Tongue v. Nutwell, 13 Md. 415 (1859).
177. The Rule apparently was first applied in Maryland in Davidge v. Chaney, 4
H. & McH. 393 (Md. 1799) and Johnson v. Negro Lish, 4 H. & J. 441 (Md. 1819). Both of
these cases held that an executory devise limited over on the indefinite failure of issue of
the devisee (or legatee or grantee) of the preceding absolute (fee simple) interest (in
personalty in these cases) is too remote, and thus is void. Neither case, however, either
stated or referred to the Rule, except by implication from the holding therein. The Rule
first was stated in Maryland in Dallam v. Dallam's Lessee, 7 H & J. 220 (Md. 1826), which
involved the construction and validity of a limitation which, in substance, may be stated
as follows: "To A and his heirs, but if A dies before the age of twenty-one years, and
without issue, then to B and his heirs." In holding that A took a fee simple subject to a
valid executory limitation in favor of B, rather than a fee tail, the Court of Appeals stated
that "no limitation can be good as an executory devise, unless it be on a contingency, that
must happen, if at all, within a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years and a fraction
of a year afterwards." [Dallam v. Dallam's Lessee, 7 H. & J. 220, 236 (Md. 1826)]. The
court, however, cited no authority for this proposition, although, elsewhere in its opinion,
it cited Barnitz's Lessee v. Casey, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 456 (1813) (error to the Circuit Court
for the District of Maryland), which itself simply stated, without citation of authority,
that "[it is the acknowledged rule, that an executory devise is not too remote, if the
contingency may happen within a life or lives in being, or twenty-one years and a few
months after." [Id. at 469 (1813).] Moreover, the subsequent Maryland cases stating
and/or applying the Rule apparently regard Dallam as the basis of the Rule in Maryland.
See, e.g., in chronological order, Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 111 (Md. 1827); Barnum
v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119 (Perkins' Annot. Ed.), 90 Am. Dec. 88 (1866); Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 A. 1094 (1914); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93,
179 A. 536 (1935).
178. In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 105, 179 A. 536, 542 (1935),
the court, in tracing the evolution of the Rule, stated:
Prior to that case [Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.
1682), aff'd, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 963 (H.L. 1685)], it had been held
in Taylor v. BiddaU. .. that an executory devise to the heirs of a living person when
they attained the age of twenty-one years was good; other extensions were established in Gore v. Gore.. , Staines v. Maddox .. , Lloyd v. Carew.. , until
finally in Cadell v. Palmer.. , it was decided that a 'gross term of twenty-one
years, without reference to any period of minority, might be taken, with the addition, when necessary, of the period of gestation.' Holdsworth's History, Eng. Law,
227. And so the rule now stands.
(emphasis in final sentence added).
179. 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
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of the permissible period of the Rule to be a period in gross, which
is not, and need not be, related to any actual minority. Certainly,
the Maryland Court of Appeals has so held in at least five cases.1 0
In fact, the Maryland Court of Appeals appears to feel that, in
so holding, it is stating the obvious, for it has not found such
holdings worthy of discussion.'"' Robinson v. Bonaparte,12 for
example, involved a proceeding to construe a testamentary trust,
the income of which was to be applied to the support of the
testator's issue "until the expiration of the period of twenty years
after my death and the death of my wife; at which period of
time"' the trust corpus was limited to vest in, and be distributed
to, the testator's then living issue. The testator was survived by
his wife and three children. The basic issue before the court was
whether the trust was limited to terminate on the last to occur of
the death of the testator's wife and the expiration of 20 years from
the death of the testator, or whether it was limited to terminate
20 years after the death of the last to die of testator and his wife.
After holding that the latter construction was the correct one, the
court further held the limitation, as so construed, to be valid
under the Rule, stating only, and without citation of authority,
that "inasmuch as the period prescribed by the testator does not
contravene the policy of the law, and is not and cannot possibly
be repugnant to the rule against perpetuities, he had a perfect
right to prolong the trust for the period which he designated
180. Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 155 A.2d 702
(1959) (by implication); Loats Female Orphan Asylum of Frederick City v. Essom, 220
Md. 11, 150 A.2d 742 (1959) (by implication); Marty v. First National Bank of Baltimore,
209 Md. 210, 120 A.2d 841 (1956) (by implication); Billingsley v. Bradley, 166 Md. 412,
171 A. 351 (1934) (by implication); Robinson v. Bonaparte, 102 Md. 63, 61 A. 212 (1905)
(by implication). In two other cases, moreover, wherein the vesting of the interests therein
limited was held, in will construction proceedings, to be postponed for a period in
gross of 20 years after lives in being at their creation, such postponement must be deemed
to have been assumed valid, since the question of violation of the rule against perpetuities
was not even raised. See Sutton v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 155 Md. 483, 142 A. 627
(1928); Mercer v. Hopkins, 88 Md. 292, 41 A. 156 (1898). Cf. Hardgrove v. Hardgrove, 240
Md. 634, 215 A.2d 183 (1965) (validating an equitable charge on an outright devise of
property in fee simple, which charge was limited to endure for a period in gross of 20
years); Clark v. Clark, 99 Md. 356, 58 A. 24 (1904) (invalidating a direct restraint on
alienation for a ten year period in gross).
181. See Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 534, 155 A.2d
702 (1959); Loats Female Orphan Asylum of Frederick City v. Essom, 220 Md. 11, 150
A.2d 742 (1959); Marty v. First National Bank of Baltimore, 209 Md. 210, 120 A.2d 841
(1956); Billingsley v. Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 171 A. 351 (1934); Robinson v. Bonaparte, 102
Md. 63, 61 A. 212 (1905).
182. 102 Md. 63, 61 A. 212 (1905).
183. 102 Md. 63, 65, 61 A. 212, 213 (1905).
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... ,"I Similarly, Loats Female Orphan Asylum of Frederick
City v. Essom'8 5 involved the construction of a will which devised
realty to the testator's niece until the first to occur of her death
or marriage, then to a described corporation, if in fact incorporated within 20 years after the testator's death. The corporation,
though non-existent at the testator's death, was incorporated two
years thereafter. The court held the limitation to the corporation
to be valid as an executory devise. It further held, in its only
reference to the Rule and without citation of authority, that
"[in the instant case there is no problem as to the rule against
perpetuities, because of the time limitation."'' 8 Even less consideration was given to the period in gross problem in Fitzpatrick v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.. ' Fitzpatrick involved the
validity of the exercise by the life beneficiary-co-settlor of an inter
vivos trust of her testamentary special power of appointment. She
had duly exercised her power to create a further trust: income to
be paid to her children for their lives; the trust, with relation to
each child's share, to continue for a period in gross of 20 years
after such child's death, at the end of which time it would terminate and the corpus thereof vest and be distributed. However,
only one of the power holder's children was in existence in 1876,
when the power was created, although all were in existence both
in 1895, when the power to revoke the trust expired, and in 1924,
when the power holder died. The sole question for decision, so far
as the court was concerned, was when the period of the Rule
began to run. In fact, in holding that the period of the Rule began
to run in 1895, and thus validating the secondary interests limited
to vest 20 years after the respective deaths of the power holder's
children, the court stated, without citation of authority:
All parties agree that if the referable date of the Rule is that
of the deed of trust in 1876, all of the secondary estates
involved herein are invalid; because they would not necessarily have vested [and, in fact, did not vest] within a life
or lives in being and twenty-one years plus the usual period
of gestation, thereafter. On the other hand, they also agree
that if the referable date is either 1895, when Mrs. Hawkins'
authority to revoke the deed of trust expired, or 1924, when
her will became effective, all of the secondary limitations are
good, as they would then have had to become vested within
184.
185.
186.
187.

102
220
220
220

Md.63, 72, 61 A. 212, 216 (1905).
Md.11, 150 A.2d 742 (1959).
Md.11, 20, 150 A.2d 742, 747 (1959).
Md.534, 155 A.2d 702 (1959).
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the time prescribed by the Rule. 88
This cursory approach of the Maryland Court of Appeals to
the period-in-gross problem is not, however, either surprising or
unwarranted. For, these holdings of the Maryland Court of Appeals not only are in accord with the judicial authority hereinbefore discussed,' but also are in accord with the uniform opinion
of the textwriters in this area.'90 Fratcher, for example, states:
The common law of England was received as the law of
Michigan in the last decade of the eighteenth century ...
By the end of the seventeenth century it had been settled that a future interest which must necessarily vest within
lives in being plus an actual minority plus one or more actual
periods of gestation did not offend the rule. It had also been
settled that a future interest which must necessarily vest
within lives in being plus one year in gross did not violate the
Rule. When English law came to Michigan, the only question
relative to the permissible period of postponement of vesting
under the Rule Against Perpetuities which was still undecided was that of the maximum allowable number of years
in gross. Before that numerous dicta had suggested that this
was twenty-one years. . . . and this was established as the
law of England by a decision in 1833. Such a decision was
predictable when Michigan adopted the common law, and
the rule it announced may be considered as part of that
9
law.' 1
Likewise, according to Frank, "[tlhere is no decision in this
State [Maryland] upon the question as to whether or not an
estate to arise within twenty-one years, in gross, (i.e., without
reference to any lives,) would be good, but undoubtedly such an
'
estate would be held valid. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372.1 92
In fact, the nearest any jurisdiction has come to repudiating
Cadell is the dictum of the New Hampshire Supreme Court that
188. 220 Md. 534, 542-543, 155 A.2d 702, 706 (1959). Similarly, in each of Marty v.
First National Bank of Baltimore, 209 Md. 210, 120 A.2d 841 (1956), and Billingsley v.
Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 171 A. 351 (1934), the Maryland Court of Appeals, without discussion or citation of authority, validated a postponement of vesting for a period in gross of
21 years after lives in being at the creation of the interest in question.
189. See notes 167-174 supra, and accompanying text.
190. See Frank, Note (c)3 to Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119 (1866) (Perkins' Annot.
Ed.); W. FRATcHER, supra note 29, at 270, 271; J. GRAY, supra note 2, §§ 186, 200, 223; 4
J. KENT, supra note 4, at *17-*18, *267-*271 & n.(g); E. MiLLER, JR., supra note 2, § 323;
3 L. SIMES & A. SMrH, supra note 2, § 1225.
191. W. FRATCHER, supra note 29, at 270-271.
192. Note (c)3 to Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119 (1866) (Perkins' Annot. Ed.).
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adding a term of twenty-one years in gross without reference
to the infancy of a beneficiary. . .are open questions in this
jurisdiction. A devise to trustees for accumulation during the
lives of all the testator's descendants living at his death, and
twenty-one years more, without reference to a case of infancy, and then to his most wealthy heir bearing his name,
would require an examination of the reasons of the law, and
of the reasons given for the judgments rendered in. . . Cadell
v. Palmer. . . .There are many English rules the adoption
of which is not necessary here to prevent a disturbance of
titles ....
93
CONCLUSION

It thus is clear that, at the time as of which we received the
English common law,'94 the 21 year element of the permissible
period of the Rule was potentially, if not actually, a period in
gross unrelated to any actual minority-i.e., unrelated to any person's status as a minor or adult. As the United States Supreme
Court put it, albeit as dictum,
The rule of the common law, by which an estate devised
must at all events vest within a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years afterwards, has reference to time and not
to persons. . . .the twenty-one years afterwards are not regulated by the birth or the coming of age of any person, for
they begin, not with a birth, but with a death, and are
twenty-one years in gross, without regard to the life, or to the
coming of age, of any person soever. Cadell v. Palmer. .... "I
Consequently, a reduction in the age of majority should have
no effect on the permissible period of the Rule, irrespective of its
historical origin. In fact, to the extent that evidence thereof is
available, this would appear to have been the legislative intent
in reducing the age of majority below 21 for all purposes in those
jurisdictions in which the permissible period of the Rule is a
creation of the common law. Four of these jurisdictions, at least,
have statutes which reduce an age contingency to 21, if it is contained in a limitation which would violate the Rule because contingent upon someone's attainment of, or failure to attain, an age
193. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 461, 31 A. 900, 909 (1891). Edgerly v. Barker,
supra, was quoted from and approved in Rolfe & Rumford Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N.H.
238, 45 A. 1087 (1898) (dictum).
194. Even if prior to the decision in The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22
Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682), afi'd, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 53, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 963 (H.L. 1685). See
Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391 (1896), and text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
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in excess of 21.190 Three of these four jurisdictions,'97 however,
made no change in these statutes when they reduced the age of
majority below 21. One of them, in fact, after reducing the age of
majority to 18 in 1973, reenacted in 1974, without substantive
change, its statute reducing age contingencies to twenty-one." 8
The fourth jurisdiction, when it reduced the age of majority to 18,
did concurrently amend its age contingency statute to provide for
the reduction of age contingencies to 18 rather than 21.199 This
amendment, however, apparently was by mistake. For, at the
next session thereof, its legislature once more amended its age
contingency statute, to provide that age contingencies are to be
reduced only to 21 to prevent violation of the Rule. 2 Thus, since
reduction of an age contingency to 21 would not prevent violation
of the Rule if a reduction in the age of majority were deemed to
reduce the permissible period of the Rule to eighteen years after
a life or lives in being, the legislative intent in reducing the age
of majority must be presumed, at least in these four jurisdictions,
to be that such reduction have no effect on the permissible period
of the Rule. But, even absent such indications of legislative intent, the same result must obtain. For, the judicial adoption, in
this country, of the common law rule against perpetuities, 0' exemplifies the dictum of Mr. Justice Buller, in Thellusson v.
Woodford, 21 that
Whether our predecessors acted wisely or unwisely in the
line, they took in adopting the rules as to executory devise,
is not now the question; for the rule allowing any number of
lives in being, a reasonable time for gestation, and twentyone years, is now the clear law, that has been settled and
followed for ages; and we cannot shake that rule without
shaking the foundations of the law. . . . As a matter of
history or curiosity an inquiry into the origin of the rule may
be the amusement of a leisure hour; but it will not afford any
assistance in the decision of a Court of Justice.
195. McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 383 (1884).
196. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (1970), as amended in 1972 by § 68 [1972]
Conn. P.A. 127 (Supp. 1973), and as further amended in 1973 by [19731 Conn. P.A. 7335; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30. § 194 (c)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1961), added in 1969 (Supp. 1974);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 11-103(b)
(1974), formerly Md. Ann. Code, art. 93, § 11-103 (b) (1969).
197. Illinois, Maine and Maryland.
198. MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 11-103 (b) (1974), formerly Md. Ann. Code
art. 93, § 11-103 (b) (1969).
199. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (1970), as amended in 1972 by § 68 [1972]
Conn. P.A. 127 (Supp. 1973).
200. [1973] Conn. P.A. 73-35.
201. See notes 166-193 supra and accompanying text.
202. 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 319, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 162 (Ch. 1799).

